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Abstract
This thesis investigates monetary transmission asymmetries in CEE region.
The first part addresses the role of credit growth in monetary transmission in
the Czech Republic. Employing Logistic Smooth Transition Vector Autoregres-
sion model over the 1998:M1-2012:M3 period, we find that high credit growth
dampens the effectiveness of monetary policy. No asymmetries in relative ef-
fects of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks have been
documented. In the second part, we apply the variation of Panel VAR to ex-
amine the role of financial structure in monetary transmission. The analysis
is conducted on a sample of eight CEE states, encompassing the 1999:Q1-
2009:Q4 period. Higher credit dependence is found to enhance the interest
rate pass-through. However, cross-country asymmetries vanish when the credit
dependence is interacted with the measure of banking sector competition. The
ultimate role of financial structure in output and price fluctuations is indeter-
minable.
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This essay investigates whether the monetary policy in CEE region may have
asymmetric effects. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of monetary actions
based on the underlying credit conditions and financial structure. Over the
past two decades, CEE economies have been affected by numerous structural
changes, including the transition to a market-based economy, trade integra-
tion with the European Union and global financial crisis. These developments
have been complemented by the reforms aimed at promoting macroeconomic
and financial stability. As an outcome, monetary transmission mechanism may
have undergone certain changes. Our focus is on three key issues: propagation
of monetary shocks at different stages of credit cycle, relative potency of con-
tractionary versus expansionary monetary shocks and the cumulative impact
of various components of financial structure on monetary transmission.
The first part of our analysis explores the relative potency of monetary
shocks in the Czech Republic based on the credit market liquidity. Several pa-
pers provide evidence of asymmetries in specific aspects of monetary propaga-
tion, including the exchange rate channel and monetary policy rule (Babetskaia-
Kukharchuk 2007; Horváth 2008b; Fidrmuc et al. 2008; Vaš́ıček 2011). Our
analysis is pursued within the framework of Logistic Smooth Transition Vector
Autoregression (LSTVAR) model, which allows for asymmetric propagation of
monetary policy shocks and endogenous regime switches without a priori as-
sumptions about their particular dates. We track the evolution of monetary
transmission mechanism over the longer sample period and with the methodol-
ogy previously unapplied on CEE sample, thereby contributing to the existing
empirical literature.
1. Introduction 2
In the context of CEE region, one-country samples may be too short to pro-
vide robust conclusions. As advised by Jarociński (2008), we pool the data for
eight CEE countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia to test for the role of financial structure in
monetary transmission. We employ Panel Conditionally Homogenous Vector
Autoregression (PCHVAR) model over the 1999:Q1-2009:Q4 sample. The two
proxies for financial structure are the economy’s credit dependence and bank-
ing sector competition.
The rest of the essay is structured as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the most
relevant economic theories behind the transmission channels. Chapter 3 pur-
sues the LSTVAR analysis for the Czech Republic. The importance of financial
structure for monetary transmission is tested by PCHVAR in the Chapter 4.




Surveying the process of monetary transmission is a daunting challenge. Not
so long ago, Bernanke & Gertler (1995) attributed it a notion of the black box.
The past two decades have seen a proliferation of empirical papers attempting
to decipher the issue. Recent advances notwithstanding, this domain continues
to preserve its original research appeal. A number of questions are yet to be
answered. This issue comes to the fore in CEE region, where the much-needed
research is still relatively sparse. Evaluating the power of monetary policy
instrument to affect inflation or exchange rate is at the heart of all monetary
arrangements. In the context of convergence with the euro area, understanding
fundamental forces behind monetary transmission is of an utmost importance.
The notion of monetary policy asymmetries has been well established in
macroeconomics (Blinder 1987; Bernanke & Gertler 1989; Bernanke et al. 1996).
This chapter identifies two channels of monetary transmission which may be
the source of asymmetries. We then turn our focus to the empirical evidence
provided up-to-date.
2.1 Theoretical Background
2.1.1 Interest Rate Channel
Interest rate channel is the oldest and most conventional transmission chan-
nel. The propagation of monetary shocks is relatively simple: increase in policy
rate entails higher deposit and loan rates, yields on government bills and bonds,
along with the drop in equity prices. Higher nominal rate and price stickiness
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act to induce higher real rate, depressing investment, consumption and output.
A voluminous strand of literature identifies the sources of monetary trans-
mission asymmetries in the mechanism outlined above. Ball & Mankiw (1994)
and Tsiddon (1993) introduce the model with downward price rigidity. Assum-
ing a change in monetary policy stance and the corresponding adjustment in
trend inflation, firm’s desired price level is altered. However, downward and
upward adjustment entail different costs. Inflation depresses the firm’s relative
price, which renders the cost of downward adjustment lower. Hence, expan-
sionary and contractionary monetary policy may have asymmetric effects on
prices. Kandil (1995) applies the same line of reasoning to downward wage
rigidity, citing its positive correlation with the price rigidity. Both studies con-
clude that nominal rigidities exacerbate the negative effects of contractionary
demand shock on output.
Certain works ascribe monetary transmission asymmetries to the inflation
rate (Shen & Chiang 1999; Mandler 2010). Monetary expansion stimulates the
investment by lowering the interest rate, whereas higher level of investment
acts to induce inflation. Consequently, increased inflationary expectations may
invalidate the effects of monetary policy.
To analyze the degree of interest rate pass-through, it is instructive to de-
compose the transmission process into two distinct stages: (1) transmission
from policy rate to long-term money market rate, and further to lending and
deposit rates, (2) transmission to the real economy. The first stage crucially
hinges upon the yield curve.1 Transmission of interest rate from market to
retail rates is described by marginal cost pricing model by Rousseas (1985):
i
B = µ+ β · iM , (2.1)
where iB is the bank lending/deposit rate, iM represents the money market
rate and µ stands for a constant markup. Changes in money market rate are
fully propagated to the retail rates only if β equals 1. In the case of imperfect
competition or information asymmetries, β will be different than unity.
The value of β depends on a range of factors. First, low elasticity of de-
mand for loanable funds or deposits renders banks less responsive to market
rate changes. This is pronounced in the absence of alternative sources of fi-
1 Égert et al. (2007) cite four key determinants of the yield curve: (1) liquidity preference:
less liquid long-term investment induce higher long-term interest rate, (2) market segmen-
tation: short- and long-term rates may be determined at separate markets, (3) inflation
expectations, (4) exchange rate expectations.
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nancing or investment opportunities. Next, weak competitive pressures may
insulate the retail rates from money market fluctuations, while more strenu-
ous competition drives down the lending rate. The presence of asymmetric
information may have two contrasting outcomes: credit rationing and higher
interest rate. Further, the adjustment of lending rates is sluggish if there is no
maturity mismatch.
Following the reaction to a monetary policy shock, interest rates impinge
on the real economic activity. However, it is often argued that the interest rate
channel alone cannot explain large shifts in economic activity emanating from
monetary actions. This failure may emanate from flawed assumptions, namely
that bonds and loans are perfect substitutes and that banks assume only a
passive role of attracting the deposits. Moreover, it is important to disentangle
between the shifts in loan demand and loan supply. Thus, we examine the
functioning of credit channel.
2.1.2 Credit Channel
Credit channel rests on the assumption of financial frictions. In this respect,
credit rationing model is instructive to begin with. Its crucial assumption is the
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, who know little about
each other. Banks play an intermediation role. Borrowing is collateralized due
to an imperfect enforcement of loan contracts, whereas the value of collateral
depends on asset prices. Shifts in expectations induce asset price fluctuations,
shocks to the financial sector and eventually, their propagation to the real
economy.
Bank Lending Channel
Bank lending channel propagates monetary policy shocks by affecting the amount
of credit extended to firms and consumers. In one of the pioneering works in
this domain, Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) coined the theory of credit rationing,
which carries a strong message: loan market equilibrium may be characterized
by credit rationing. To restate, if the equilibrium requires higher interest rate,
banks may find it more profitable to restrict the credit instead. The reason is
twofold. First, interest rate hikes depress the returns on successful projects,
lowering banks’ profits. Second, higher interest rate leads to an adverse se-
lection problem: the prevalence of bad borrowers exacerbates the risk to the
banks’ portfolio. Thus, credit rationing appears as a more reasonable solution.
2. Remarks on Monetary Transmission Asymmetries 6
Monetary contraction shrinks the banks’ balance sheets through open mar-
ket operations or higher minimum reserve requirements, which consequently
drain deposits from the system (Bernanke & Blinder 1988). Since the deposits
are an essential source of loanable funds, monetary tightening induces lending
cuts. This channel is operative under three conditions: banks are unable to
insulate their portfolios from monetary tightening; consumers and firms are un-
able to fully substitute for the shortage of loans by raising the external sources
of financing and price adjustment mechanism is imperfect. In a broader sense,
monetary policy changes affect the cost of external funding, compromising the
ability of banks and firms to maintain their loan portfolio.
A large body of evidence suggests that monetary policy impulses have dis-
tributional effects across the banks (Kashyap et al. 1993; Kashyap & Stein
1994; Kishan & Opiela 2000). First, small banks encounter more information
asymmetries and find it more difficult to raise uninsured funds in the wake of
monetary tightening. Thus, their lending cuts are disproportionately higher in
comparison to the bigger banks. Second, monetary contraction erodes the bank
capital, entailing a sharp lending contraction if the institution is highly lever-
aged. Finally, less liquid banks are more adversely affected, due to the lesser
funds to counteract the negative monetary shocks. The outlined concepts hint
that the economy’s dependence on credit (i.e. the absence of alternative sources
of financing) ought to result in a more complete interest rate pass-through.
Balance Sheet Channel
The idea of credit rationing was placed into the framework of financial ac-
celerator mechanism. This concept relates to the notion that shocks to the
real economy are amplified by deteriorating financial conditions. More pre-
cisely, higher cost of lending in downturns leads to an increase in uncertainty
of projects and external finance premium. Consequently, lenders require higher
collateral as a buffer against possible losses. External finance premium, which
is inversely related to the borrower’s net worth, is on a rise. Hence, borrowers
are unable to provide the collateral required. In response, banks restrict their
credit supply, which leads to production cuts. In good times, the opposite
forces are at work: borrower’s profits and net worth rise, agency costs decline
and banks become more willing to provide funding.
Bernanke et al. (1996) argue that the firm’s balance sheet serves both as
a propagator and an amplifier of shocks. The effects of initial shock on pro-
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duction and spending are proportional to the change in borrowers’ net worth.
Thus, the propagation of good times ensues as a result of increasing net worth
and abundant credit. On the contrary, shrinking balance sheets restrict the
credit availability and reinforce the downturns.
In the studies by Kiyotaki & Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1998) and
Moody & Taylor (2003), the idea of financial accelerator was expanded and
modelled in a more sophisticated manner. Bernanke et al. (1998) build the
dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions and four types of
agents: households, entrepreneurs, retailers and government. Households lend
money to the entrepreneurs, who sell their products to the retailers. Govern-
ment conducts the monetary and fiscal policy. Intuitively, if Miller-Modigliani
theorem does not hold, higher agency costs will be compensated by a higher
external finance premium. On the other hand, external finance premium is
highly countercyclical, due to the procyclicality of net worth. As an impli-
cation, downturns enhance swings in borrowing, which depresses investment,
production and overall level of consumption. Hence, monetary policy shock is
expected to exhibit a stronger impact on spending of credit-constrained firms.
A general conclusion is that financial frictions magnify the effects of monetary
shocks on investment and output.
This concept is widely applied in a number of papers. For instance, Kiy-
otaki & Moore (1997) describe the interaction of credit constraints and aggre-
gate economic activity over the phases of business cycle. They develop a simple
stylized equilibrium model, in which durable assets have a dual role, as a factor
of production and a collateral for loans. Borrower’s credit limits are affected
by the asset prices. On the other hand, asset prices affect the borrower’s net
worth, the value of collateral and access to credit. Consequently, the most
adversely affected agents are those who experience the highest decline in col-
lateral prices. Holmstrom & Tirole (1997) introduce the model with limited
borrowing capacity of both firms and banks. Funding sources are dependent
on the firm’s net worth. Due to higher agency costs, credit crunch hits highly
leveraged firms more than the well-capitalized ones. This model is motivated
by the financial crises underwent by several OECD economies throughout the
1980s and 1990s. Its predictions are consistent with the fluctuations observed
in the examined period. Azariadis & Smith (1998) explore the transmission of
credit shocks in traditional overlapping generations (OLG) setting. The econ-
omy lies either in a traditional Walrasian regime, characterized by unfettered
operation of the credit markets, or the regime with binding credit constraints.
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Regime switches occur as a result of changing market expectations: more pes-
simistic mood prompts the depositors to transfer their funds out of the banking
sector for less productive purposes. Consequently, credit supply falls, shifting
the equilibrium to a credit-constrained regime. An uplift in market expecta-
tions moves the economy back to the Walrasian regime. The study argues that
the result is a set of equilibrium interest rates on loans that validate the de-
positors’ original beliefs. Finally, Cooper & Corbae (2001) analyze financial
collapses and their real implications through the prism of disrupted financial
intermediation. Intermediary is viewed as a coalition of lenders, whose mem-
bers share the fixed cost of lending. If a single agent believes that many others
will join the coalition, his cost of lending declines, which in turn induces a high
degree of participation. In glooms, the number of lenders decreases, reinforcing
credit supply shortages. Thus, the intermediation is belief-driven: its success
will depend on the confidence placed into the system. This model is able to
replicate some of the key empirical facts of the Great Depression.
2.2 Evidence on the Interest Rate Channel
This section attempts to gather information on the determinants of pass-
through from policy rate to money market rate, retail rates and to the real
economy. This interplay has been explored in the context of financial struc-
ture, which is inseparable from the functioning of broad credit channel. Hence,
we attempt to provide a comprehensive literature review below.
Many observers have noted that the retail interest rate exhibits downward
rigidity. Specifically, market pressure induces a quick upward adjustment of
the lending rate, while the downward adjustment is more sluggish. Similar
relationship holds for borrowing rates. Weth (2002) finds that German banks
were largely characterized by this behavior during the 1990s. However, the
speed of interest rate adjustment varied depending on the banks’ structural
characteristics. Low market rates induce a drain on deposits. In a given situa-
tion, large banks are able to refinance quickly, due to the better capital market
access. Hence, their interest rate is less downward rigid. Consequently, banks
financed mainly by the savings deposits are less responsive to changes in the
money market rate.
De Bondt (2005) tackles the issue more in-depth by considering the term
structure of the interest rates. Euro area policy rate shifts are fully propa-
gated to the short-term money market rates (up to three months). Monetary
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authorities’ leverage diminishes with an increasing maturity of money market
instrument. The pass-through from money market to retail rates is partial in
the short-run, but substantial in the long-run. However, 100% propagation is
detected only in the case of bank lending rates. The stickiest are the overnight
and short-term deposit rates, with the long-term propagation amounting to
40% only. In a similar manner, Kwapil & Scharler (2006) draw a comparison of
the interest rate pass-through between US and euro area. In both regions, the
transmission of money market rate to retail rates is low for instruments with
short maturities, but increases substantially with the term structure. Contrary
to the household interest rates, corporate lending rates are heavily affected by
the monetary policy shocks. Finally, the pass-through is found to be stronger
in US than in the euro area.
Structure of the banking market and its ramifications for monetary trans-
mission mechanism have been widely explored in the literature. The corner-
stone study by Mojon (2000) analyzes six largest EU economies over the 1979-
1998 time span, concluding that financial market deregulation and increased
competition bolster the interest rate pass-through.2 Further, it is found that
higher volatility of money market rates impinges on monetary transmission.
Gropp et al. (2007) study the pass-through dynamics from market to retail
rates on a panel of euro zone banks for the 1994-2002 period. In the spirit
of related literature, an incomplete short-run pass-through is documented. In-
terest rates on consumer loans and current account deposits tend to be the
most rigid. The dynamics of interest rate cycle is asymmetric, with the loan
(deposit) rates exhibiting downward (upward) rigidity. The authors argue that
strong competition suppresses this anomaly. In a more recent study, Van Leu-
vensteijn et al. (2008) explicitly test for the importance of bank competition
in monetary transmission mechanism on a sample of euro zone data. Tighter
competition depresses the lending rates, which corroborates findings from the
other studies. Somewhat counterintuitive, deposit rates also tend to fall. This
result is justified by the fact that, in an attempt to compensate for the reduc-
tion in loan market income, banks decrease their deposit rates as well.
The size of mortgage market may approximate the economy’s credit depen-
dence. In the context of our analysis, a number of studies have explored its
role in monetary transmission mechanism. Using a sample of OECD econo-
mies, Sá et al. (2011) find that more developed mortgage market amplifies the
effects of monetary policy and capital inflow shocks. This is indicative about
2 The sample comprises Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Netherlands and Belgium.
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the presence of financial accelerator. Specifically, in a well-developed market,
households can pledge higher value of their residential property as a collateral.
Since small interest rate shifts can have a large impact on households’ ability to
service the debt, risk premium is more sensitive in the case of highly indebted
agents. Hence, this type of market setting fosters monetary transmission.
Goodhart & Hofmann (2008) document an operative multifaceted link be-
tween monetary policy, credit, housing prices and real economy in OECD econ-
omies. More precisely, money growth affects credit and house prices, whereas
house prices exert influence over credit and money. The same can be stated
about the impact of credit on the remaining two variables. Booming hous-
ing market strengthens the repercussions of money and credit shocks on house
prices. However, this result must be taken with a pinch of salt due to wide
confidence intervals. Assenmacher-Wesche & Gerlach (2008) construct a range
of proxies for financial structure, including the importance of floating rate lend-
ing, the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal, the loan-to-value ratio for
new mortgages, the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio and securitization, to inves-
tigate its interaction with the monetary transmission. Impulse responses of
residential property prices to a monetary policy shock do hinge upon financial
structure, albeit its impact is not overarching. The authors hint that financial
structure variables may offset each other, diminishing the difference between
the economies.
The final strand of literature deems legal system the crucial factor of mon-
etary transmission, due to its correlation with the financial structure. Im-
portantly, it builds on the findings related to bank lending and balance sheet
channel. Cecchetti (1999) attributes cross-country asymmetries in monetary
transmission evident in the euro area precisely to divergent legal systems. This
study argues that legal systems cause differences in size, concentration and
stability of the banking sector, which entails inconsistent responses of inflation
and output to monetary policy shocks. Asymmetries are further reinforced by
the size and scope of capital markets and availability of alternative sources of
financing. Elbourne & De Haan (2004) argue that these findings are not robust
across different specifications. Namely, combining different indicators of finan-
cial structure into one may produce spurious correlations. When individual
indicators are inspected, the correlation with monetary transmission turns out
insignificant.
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2.3 Evidence on the Credit Channel
Empirical studies offer a certain degree of support for the hypothesis of non-
linear propagation of monetary policy shocks. Macro-level studies generally
establish the evidence of asymmetries without pointing to a specific transmis-
sion channel. On the other hand, studies employing the micro-level data tend
to explore either the broad credit channel. We present the empirical evidence
and discuss some methodological considerations below.
2.3.1 Macro-level Evidence
Macro-level analyses have been conducted for a wide range of countries. Early
studies rely on the stylized facts and simple regressions to detect the asym-
metries in monetary transmission. In one of the pioneering studies, McCallum
(1991) investigates the effectiveness of monetary policy over the phases of credit
cycle. Based on several criteria, including an unusual increase in federal funds
rate, high borrowing by the commercial banks, rate inversion, deterioration of
business balance sheets and a high demand for short-term credit, the author
finds evidence of seven post-1950s credit crunch periods in US. Methodology
is based on a linear regression, which includes dummy variable for the state
of credit regime (one if economy is credit restricted, zero otherwise). The key
findings indicate high potency and substantial role of monetary shocks in GDP
fluctuations when credit rationing is active. Galbraith (1996) tests for possible
threshold effects of money changes on output in US and Canada. The model
takes the following form:










where yt is the real GDP, gt real government expenditure on goods and ser-
vices, and mt real M1 aggregate. All the variables are in their logarithmic
form. Galbraith employs Monte Carlo simulation to select the threshold value
of money supply. The study detects substantial asymmetries. These findings
are plagued by a high threshold, which does not allow for clear distinction be-
tween the periods of tight and loose monetary policy. Hence, asymmetries may
be attributed to some phenomenon other than the credit rationing.
The bulk of macro-level analyses uses some variant of Vector Autoregression
(VAR) model, which is designed to capture interdependencies among multiple
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series. Albeit atheoretical, this model has been fairly successful in replicating
some of the key facts of business cycle fluctuations in developed countries. Two
influential works, by Christiano et al. (1999) and Mojon & Peersman (2001),
summarize stylized facts about monetary transmission for US economy and
individual countries of the euro area. However, this vein of literature fails to
consider the existence of asymmetries inherent to the underlying theory and
implicit in identifying assumptions of the model.
Peersman & Smets (2001) remedy for the flaws above by combining VAR
with a version of Markov switching model, called Hamilton filter. Hamilton
filter assumes the existence of two regimes, with the likely switching dates de-
termined endogenously. The analysis is undertaken to investigate monetary
policy asymmetries in Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Austria, Belgium
and France for the 1978-1998 period. The model contains a vector of ex-
ogenous (world commodity price index, the US short-term interest rate and
US real GDP) and endogenous variables (real GDP, consumer prices, nominal
three-month short-term interest rate and a real effective exchange rate). Three
remarkable findings can be carved out. First, monetary tightening has sub-
stantial negative effect on output and prices and vice versa. Second, monetary
policy shocks are considerably more potent when the economy is in recession.
Finally, the evidence of regime switches is weak: interest rate hikes reduce the
probability of staying in a boom only slightly, while no direct switch from boom
to recession occurs.
Balke (2001) employs Threshold Vector Autoregression (TVAR) on US data
(1960:Q1-1997:Q3) to examine the role of credit in monetary transmission.
TVAR is designed to capture regime shifts and asymmetries implied by the
theoretical models. Contrary to the Markov switching model, TVAR does not
assume random regime shifts. Instead, it splits the sample based on the thresh-








Yt−1)I(ct−d ≥ γ) + Ut, (2.3)
where Yt = [yt, πt, loan − p,Rt] (real GDP, inflation rate, loans to the private
sector deflated by GDP deflator and the measure of average nominal interest
rate respectively), Yt−1 is the lag polynomial matrix, ct−d represents a measure
of credit conditions and γ stands for the threshold value. γ is a an indicator
variable which takes the value one when ct−d ≥ γ (high credit growth regime)
and zero otherwise. Threshold value between tight and loose credit regime is
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estimated as in Galbraith (1996). The results reiterate the notion of asymmet-
ric interest rate pass-through at different stages of credit cycle. Furthermore,
contractionary shocks appear to be more potent than the expansionary ones.
However, if endogenous regime shifts emanate from shocks to variables other
than the interest rate (consumption, investment), the evidence of asymmetries
largely disappears. Atanasova (2003) replicates Balke’s study on a sample of
UK monthly data, spanning the 1984-2002 period. This paper employs corpo-
rate bond spread as a single measure of credit conditions.3 An estimated model
suggests that the effects of monetary shocks on output growth, inflation and
corporate bond spread depend on the state of credit market. No evidence of
asymmetric responses to expansionary and contractionary shock is found. This
finding supports Balke’s conclusion that monetary policy displays symmetric
effects once the nonlinearities are controlled for. The study by Calza & Sousa
(2005) builds on previous works, applying the TVAR with nonlinear impulse re-
sponses on a sample of quarterly euro area data for the 1981-2002 period. This
paper finds a clear threshold effect related to the credit conditions. The impact
of credit shocks on output and inflation differs over the phases of lending cy-
cle. The most profound response is displayed in a state of constrained lending.
When one allows for endogenous regime switches, asymmetries become limited
in size. This finding may emanate from nonlinear impulse response function:
credit shocks affect other variables in the system, which induces regime shifts.
Threshold effects appear to be lower than in US.
The studies by Shen & Chiang (1999), Weise (1999), Lo & Piger (2003),
Garcia & Schaller (2002), Mandler (2010) and Galvao & Marcellino (2011) es-
tablish two stylized facts concerning the response of output to monetary policy
action in US. First, policy actions taken during recessions appear to be more ef-
fective than those taken during expansions. Second, the evidence of asymmetry
related to the direction of shock is relatively sparse. The former is validated for
Australia (Jääskelä 2007) and Canada (Fuchun 2010). Shen & Chiang (1999)
hypothesize that the source of these regularities is inflation. More specifically,
while monetary transmission under the low inflation regime is in line with the
theoretical predictions, high inflation renders it dysfunctional. Mandler (2010)
adopts the same line of reasoning, claiming that low inflation is the the key
factor of US macroeconomic stability since 1990s. On the other hand, Galvao
3 The author defines corporate bond spread as the redemption yield on ten-year
investment-grade corporate bonds minus equivalent maturity yield on risk-free government
debt.
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& Marcellino (2011) argue that positive deviation of interest rate from the Tay-
lor rule enhances the propagation of monetary shocks. Weise (1999), Garcia
& Schaller (2002) and Lo & Piger (2003) do not relate their analyses to any
particular theory, opting to use the output growth as a proxy for economy’s
position in the business cycle instead.
It is important to note that certain studies do not find support for the
stylized facts outlined above. On a sample of post-war US data, De Long &
Summers (1988) detect the asymmetric interest rate pass-through based on
the direction of shock. This finding is supported by Cover (1988) and Thoma
(1994). A peculiarity of all the three studies is the use of money supply as a
measure of monetary policy. Weise (1999) argues that the discrepancy in re-
sults may emanate from methodological shortcomings in the latter group. For
instance, Ravn & Sola (1999) find that Cover’s evidence of asymmetry largely
disappears when one controls for policy shift at the end of Volcker’s years.
Thoma’s model specification suffers from ”impossible restrictions”: positive
and negative realizations of growth rates of money supply and output enter
the model separately. Moreover, the coefficients on output and interest rate
variables do not vary with the sign of money supply shock or the state of the
economy. As Weise highlights, it would be difficult to find a structural model
that supports this range of restrictions.
Monetary transmission asymmetries in developing economies remains a rel-
atively unexplored venue. Due to a strong volatility and structural changes, the
exact channels of transmission are difficult to identify. Bordon & Weber (2010)
and Çatik & Martin (2012) address the impact of policy shifts on monetary
transmission mechanism for Armenia and Turkey, respectively. In the early
2000s, both countries enacted a package of reforms based on the adoption of
credible monetary policy framework. The empirical analysis rests on TVAR,
which clearly detects two distinct regimes: pre-reform and post-reform. Fur-
ther, in the case of Armenia, Markov switching model identifies a structural
break around the time of policy shift. In both countries, reforms have en-
hanced the propagation of policy rate, exchange rate and credit shocks, albeit
to different extents. Upon the reform, monetary transmission in Turkey came
to resemble that of other developed economies. In Armenia, it remains in
infancy: policy rate and money supply appear to affect the price level only
slightly.
Bathaluddin et al. (2012) and Saxegaard (2006) explore the ramifications
of excess liquidity on monetary transmission. Their studies focus on Indonesia
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and Subsaharan Africa respectively.4 Saxegaard (2006) highlights the neces-
sity to distinguish between precautionary and involuntary liquidity. The former
refers to liquid funds held by financial institutions in order to buffer against
events with adverse implications, while the latter stands for aggregate excess
liquidity.5 Liquidity held for precautionary purposes is found not to bear an in-
flationary potential, which renders the sterilization unnecessary. On the other
hand, involuntary liquidity carries the risk of excessive lending in the envi-
ronment of high aggregate demand. Hence, it may reduce the effectiveness of
monetary policy in controlling inflation. Bathaluddin et al. (2012) apply the
TVAR approach on Indonesian sample (2001:M8-2010:M9), detecting the shift
from low to high involuntary excess liquidity regime in 2005. The results vali-
date Saxegaard’s argument that the leverage of monetary authorities in a high
liquidity regime decays.
2.3.2 Micro-level Evidence
Micro-level studies in this domain are often motivated by the small shocks,
big swings puzzle: the observation that small aggregate shocks cause large
fluctuations. Behavior of households, corporate and banking sector may be
instructive about the monetary transmission asymmetries.
Evidence on the Bank Lending Channel
Empirical studies on US and euro zone have provided a relatively mixed evi-
dence on the issue. Kashyap & Stein (1994) test for the effectiveness of bank
lending channel on a sample of US banks. The channel is found to be opera-
tive. Namely, under the conditions of monetary tightening, banks are unable
to fully substitute for the deposit drain by external sources of finance. Hence,
the loan supply is being restricted. In a more elaborate study, Kashyap &
Stein (2000) examine the bank lending channel on a quarterly sample of US
commercial banks spanning between 1976 and 2003. This study reaffirms the
existence of bank lending channel, finding that the monetary contraction in-
duces deep lending cuts at small and less liquid banks. Methodologically, both
studies rely on simple regressions. Kishan & Opiela (2000) investigate feder-
ally insured commercial banks for the 1980:Q1-1995:Q4 period, documenting a
4 The study by Saxegaard (2006) comprises the Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC) countries, Nigeria and Uganda.
5 Saxegaard defines excess liquidity as bank reserves deposited in the central bank plus
cash for daily operational uses minus minimum reserve requirement.
2. Remarks on Monetary Transmission Asymmetries 16
well-functioning bank lending channel. Concerning the strength and distribu-
tional effects of monetary policy shocks, this paper comes up with several novel
conclusions. Size and capitalization are found to be important determinants
of the response to a monetary shock. Loan supply of small undercapitalized
banks stumbles in response to a contractionary shock, while their long-term
deposits are completely unresponsive. This bolsters the hypothesis that small
undercapitalized banks are unable to raise external funds in the periods of tight
monetary policy.
Concerning the euro area, Farinha & Robalo Marques (2001) investigate
the functioning of bank lending channel on Portuguese micro-level data. The
analysis is conducted on a quarterly sample for the 1990:Q1-1998:Q4 period
using the panel cointegration technique. This study pinpoints capitalization as
a determinant of bank lending channel. In a large study on euro area, Ehrmann
et al. (2001) draw a comparison on the role of banks and financial markets in
monetary transmission in different economies. We highlight the most relevant
findings. First, monetary tightening entails loan supply cuts on both euro area
and country level. Liquidity is an essential factor of banks’ responsiveness to
monetary contraction. Neither size nor capitalization appear to be crucial.
This is at odds with US evidence, where the capitalization plays an important
role. The difference is ascribed to a lower information asymmetry in the euro
area, which is due to the prominent role of governments and banking networks.
Huang (2003) finds an overall support for the bank lending channel in UK: mon-
etary tightening compromises banks’ ability to provide funding, which affects
small, bank-dependent firms more severely. This does not hold for non-bank
dependent firms. The evidence above indicates that the banking sector does
not behave in a complete accordance with the theoretical predictions.
Evidence on the Balance Sheet Channel
The core analyses on the functioning of balance sheet channel were performed
on the sample of US manufacturing firms data, as provided by the Quarterly
Financial Report of Manufacturing Firms (QFR). Gertler & Gilchrist (1994)
employ a large panel of US manufacturing firms for the period spanning be-
tween 1977 and 1991 to examine their behavior under different credit market
conditions. Intuitively, agents facing higher agency cost of borrowing should
bear the brunt of lending cuts at the onset of recession. As an implication,
they are expected to account for a greater decline in economic activity. The
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results validate this line of reasoning: in the wake of contractionary monetary
shock, smaller firms undergo a disproportionate decline in sales and inventories
relatively to the large ones.
Bernanke et al. (1996) employ the same dataset as Gertler & Gilchrist
(1994), concluding that small and bank-dependent firms display a strong pro-
cyclicality of sales, inventories and net debt, with the effects of industry adjust-
ment being negligible. An influential study by Kashyap et al. (1993) explores
the behavior of US financial sector, finding that tighter monetary policy in-
duces lending cuts and a growing issuance of commercial paper. The real
effects of monetary tightening are nonlinear: investment changes are concen-
trated mainly among loan-dependent firms, which do not have an access to the
public market. A general conclusion is that the negative effects of credit shocks
are borne by small and bank-dependent firms.
Using the sample of US data for the 1964:M1-2001:M12 period, Moody &
Taylor (2003) asses the forecasting ability of several financial variables. The
nominal term spread had a satisfactory forecasting performance during the
1970s and 1980s only. This relationship broke down in 1960s and 1990s. On
the other hand, the spread between investment grade corporate debt and gov-
ernment bond yield, called high yield spread, had a substantial predictive power
during the 1990s. The authors interpret this as a result of financial market
evolution, which changes the information content of different variables. In ad-
dition, abnormally high yield has a significant short-term forecasting ability,
which implies an economic decay in the aftermath of lending cuts.
The approach above omits the fact that credit conditions are not the sole de-
terminant of corporate spreads. Spreads may exhibit a satisfactory forecasting
performance due to the fact that they reflect future expected default probabil-
ities. In order to account for these relationships, Gilchrist et al. (2009) employ
the Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregression (FAVAR) model. The analysis
is conducted on a sample of US non-financial firms for the 1990:M1-2008:M9
period. The panel consists of equity prices and individual firms’ credit spreads.
FAVAR impulse responses show that the unexpected increases in bond spreads
cause large and persistent deviations in output. Moreover, shocks emanating
from corporate bond market are found to account for more than 30% of fore-
cast error variance in economic activity at two- to four-years horizon. Overall,
these results imply that the credit market shocks are an important factor of
economic fluctuations.
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2.4 Summary of Findings
From the evidence presented above, several key findings can be carved out.
First, interest rate pass-through largely hinges upon credit dependence, com-
petitive pressures from financial sector and availability of alternative sources of
financing. Second, the response of output and prices to monetary policy shocks
is asymmetric, which is due to three reasons. Interest rate hikes compromise
the ability of the banking sector to provide funding. Smaller, less liquid and less
capitalized banks tend to be affected more severely, due to the inherent difficul-
ties in raising external funding. Furthermore, in the light of negative monetary
impulse, agents are likely to cut their spending more if the credit is already
constrained than if it is relatively abundant. Monetary contraction reduces
an investment demand; debt obligations of the borrowers increase, depleting
their liquidity and depressing the investment. Good times raise the profits and
boost the expectations. In this instance, a negative shock is unlikely to induce
considerable lending cuts. Henceforth, monetary policy tends to be more po-
tent in turmoil. Further empirical evidence demonstrates that firms respond
differently to credit shocks. Thus, the prevailing credit conditions serve as an
important nonlinear propagator of shocks.
Chapter 3
Monetary Transmission
Asymmetries in the Czech Republic
This chapter attempts to model asymmetries in the Czech monetary trans-
mission. In doing so, we do not bind ourselves to any particular transmission
channel. Instead, we adopt a macro-level approach, merely investigating the
reaction of aggregate variables to a monetary policy shock under different con-
ditions.
3.1 Literature Survey
Studies investigating monetary transmission in the Czech economy have emerged
over the recent years. Albeit few unanimous findings can be documented, we
find it instructive to summarize the most relevant ones.
3.1.1 General Evidence
Arnoštová & Hurńık (2005) estimate Linear VAR on a sample comprising the
1994-2004 period. A temporary rise in nominal short-term interest rate pro-
duces a fall in output with the peak response observed after 5 to 7 quarters.
The evidence of price puzzle is found. This anomaly disappears on a subsam-
ple excluding the period prior to the inflation targeting. Elbourne & De Haan
(2004) restrict their analysis to the same subsample and compare the perfor-
mance of different estimation strategies. Recursive estimation yields the price
puzzle, while non-recursive approach produces responses broadly in line with
the economic theory. Borys et al. (2009) employ a battery of models on a sub-
sample spanning from 1998, reporting a functional transmission mechanism.
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Contractionary monetary policy shock has a negative effect on output and
price level, reaching the bottom after roughly one year. No evidence of price
puzzle is reported. The authors underline a better performance of models us-
ing the output gap instead of output growth. Finally, Havránek et al. (2010)
investigate the Czech monetary transmission by examining the interaction of
financial and macroeconomic variables within the framework of Structural VAR
(SVAR). The sample has monthly frequency and encompasses the period from
the creation of the euro area till September 2009. A couple of findings are
worth highlighting. As regards the effects of monetary action, output responds
to monetary tightening in a hump-shaped manner; price puzzle emerges and
exchange rate initially overshoots, with the appreciation lasting somewhat less
than 20 months. The effects of an increase in credit are intuitive: it boosts the
aggregate economic activity and prices, with the maximum response after 7
months. Monetary tightening depresses credit almost instantaneously. Finally,
it is found that financial variables tend to improve the forecast of GDP and
prices. However, their forecasting performance varies, with the improvement
evident over the course of the 2008-2009 crisis.
3.1.2 Specific Aspects
Studies analyzing only one particular aspect of monetary transmission are also
insightful. Babetskaia-Kukharchuk (2007) uses a range of models to investigate
the exchange rate pass-through in the Czech economy. The author operates
with monthly data encompassing the 1996-2006 period. The propagation is
relatively fast, with an entire shock being transmitted in the first six months.
In absolute terms, the pass-through is rather weak: total response to a shock
is around 25% of its magnitude over an entire sample. Horváth (2008b) ad-
dresses the issue of asymmetric conduct of monetary policy. Motivation for
this type of analysis emanates from the question of credibility. The success of
inflation targeting regime in the Czech Republic hinged upon anchored infla-
tion expectations. Hence, target overshooting was a more dangerous outcome
than the undershooting. As a result, monetary authorities may have countered
the overshooting with a more aggressive policy stance. Estimate of the mon-
etary policy rule over the 1998-2007 sample suggests that, upon the adoption
of inflation targeting, Czech National Bank indeed responded more aggres-
sively if inflation forecast was exceeding the target. Evidence of asymmetries
vanishes when the same estimation is pursued over the 2002-2007 subsam-
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ple. Vaš́ıček (2011) augments this analysis with the examination of Minutes
of Bank Board meetings. Policy record reveals a greater distaste for inflation.
Further, the threshold analysis of monthly data spanning the 1998-2010 period
is undertaken. The findings indicate asymmetries in monetary policy stance
related to the degree of financial distress.1 Namely, financial instability appears
to prompt a more decisive response from monetary authorities. Contrary to
Horváth (2008b), no evidence of asymmetric reactions to the inflation target
overshooting/undershooting is reported. Monetary authorities do not respond
asymmetrically to downturns and expansions, either.
3.1.3 Evolution
The last vein of literature is concerned with the evolution of monetary trans-
mission mechanism. Darvas (2009) estimates the Czech monetary transmission
within the framework of Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregression (TVP
VAR) model with constant volatility. This approach recognizes gradual changes
in the economy through the concept of time-varying coefficients. The results
imply somewhat more complete interest rate pass-through over time. Albeit
the response of output in 2008 was stronger than in 1996, it must be underlined
that the evolution of monetary transmission was not monotonous. Franta et al.
(2012) employ TVP VAR with stochastic volatility. To account for macrofinan-
cial linkages, the system is augmented with several financial variables. Using
the 1996-2010 sample, prices and output are found to be more responsive to
monetary policy. Interest rate pass-through was not weakened over the course
of 2008-2009 crisis. On the other hand, the impact of exchange rate shocks is
found to decline over time, reflecting anchored inflation expectations. Credit
shocks had a substantial impact on output and prices during the period of
bank restructuring in the early 2000s, remaining negligible during the recent
crisis. Weaker impact of credit fluctuations on aggregate economic activity is
attributed to greater stability of the Czech financial system.
1 Financial distress index is constructed as a composite index of five variables: (i) the 12-
month rolling beta (derived from the capital asset pricing model - CAPM); (ii) stock market
returns (y-o-y change multiplied by minus one, implying that a fall in stock prices leads to
an increase in the index); (iii) stock market volatility (six-month rolling monthly squared
stock returns); (iv) the sovereign debt spread (the 10-year government bond yield minus the
10-year US Treasury bill yield; (v) the exchange market pressure index (m-o-m percentage
change in the exchange rate and total reserves minus gold)
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3.2 Methodology
Linear VAR is frequently used in multivariate time series modeling. A plethora
of papers on monetary transmission resorts to this particular approach. How-
ever, it fails to capture the nonlinear system dynamics, which may produce
serious forecasting errors. This chapter puts forward several notions and prob-
lems associated with Linear VAR. Building on the discussion on alternative
modeling approaches, we proceed to describe the specification used in this
study – Logistic Smooth Transition Vector Autoregression (LSTVAR) model.
3.2.1 Linear VAR
Large structural macroeconomic models of 1970s used to be criticized on the
grounds of dubious descriptive and forecasting power. Lucas critique brought
about their eventual demise. At the time, Sims (1980) pioneered VAR, which
later became the most widely applied technique in macroeconomics.
The Basics
VAR is a statistical model used to capture the dynamics and interdependencies
among multiple time series. As such, it represents a mere extension of univari-
ate autoregression model.2 Each of the n variables depends on its own lagged
values, current and past values of the remaining (n−1) variables and the white
noise. This method performs well in data mimicking and forecasting. Struc-
tural inference and policy analysis, however, are tainted by the identification
problem, i.e. the necessity to distinguish between correlation and causation
(Stock & Watson 2001).
VAR in a bivariate form and with one lag is given by:
y1t = b10 + b12y2t + γ11y1,t−1 + γ12y2,t−1 + ￿1t (3.1)
y2t = b20 + b21y1t + γ21y1,t−1 + γ22y2,t−1 + ￿2t (3.2)
This specification is plagued by inconsistency problem, since Cov(y1, ￿2t) ￿= 0
and Cov(y2, ￿1t) ￿= 0. Matrix representation of the system above is given by
Byt = Γ0 + Γ1yt−1 + ￿t, (3.3)
2 Univariate autoregression is a single-equation, single-variable linear model.
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which is labeled stuctural form VAR. This specification applies economic the-
ory to recover the original linkages among the variables. Pre-multiplying the
equation (3.3) by B−1 yields the reduced form VAR:
yt = A0 + A1xt−1 + et, (3.4)
where A0 = B−1Γ0 and A1 = B−1Γ1 and the relationship between reduced and
structural error terms is given by et = B−1￿t. Correlation among the variables
produces serial correlation among the shocks in ut as well.3 Hence, OLS esti-
mators are no longer Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE). It should be
noted that the reduced form is a mere vehicle to summarize dynamic properties
of the data.
Interpretation of the model requires structural form, which tends to be over-
parameterized. The system (3.1) – (3.2) contains 10 unknowns (8 coefficients
and 2 variances of error terms). Reduced form, on the other hand, gives us
only 8 parameters (6 coefficients, 2 variances and the covariance of the error
terms). Hence, certain identifying restrictions are necessary. In a bivariate
specification, matrix B from equation (3.3) will be of 2 × 2 dimensions; the
elements on its diagonal are ones, so B has 2× 2− 2 = 2 unknown parameters.
There are also 2 unknown variances of ￿, so the total number of unknowns
is 4. From the estimation of variance-covariance matrix of et, we can find 3
parameters; one remains unknown, which is the number of restrictions to be
imposed.4 Restrictions are typically imposed on the vector of residuals to find
the true shocks which are independent.5 The identifying restriction b12 = 0
yields the so called recursive form VAR. Assuming that y1t stands for inflation,
while y2t is the policy rate, recursive form interpretation is straightforward:
inflation is affected by historical values only, while the policy makers account
for a contemporaneous value of inflation.
3 For the proof, please refer to Enders (2004).
4 In a K-variable VAR, the number of necessary restrictions is the difference between the
number unknowns, K2 and the number of parameters estimated from variance-covariance
matrix, K
2+K
2 which equals to
K2−K
2 .
5 This is the recursiveness assumption, originally proposed by Sims (1980).
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We now indicate the recursiveness assumption in a three-variable specifica-











































The relationship between the matrix of coefficients in reduced and structural






















Assuming that the equation (3.3) in trivariate form captures monetary pol-
icy decision-making, it will contain inflation, policy rate and unemployment,
ordered in this particular sequence. This ordering scheme implies that the
contemporaneous values of inflation enter the policy rate equation, whereas
unemployment appears with a lag only. Identification restrictions a12 = a13 =









Two zeros in the first row indicate that the monetary policy shocks are in-
dependent from shocks to variables contained in the inflation equation. To
rephrase, monetary policy shock affects inflation with a lag only. A zero in the
the second row implies that monetary authorities do not observe the actual
unemployment rate at the time of decision-making. Decomposing structural
terms in a triangular fashion is called Cholesky decomposition.
Stability
An important issue in VAR model is stability. Consider the following process:
yt = A0 + A1yt−1 + et, (3.5)
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which after n backward iterations reduces to:
yt = (I + A1 + A
2
1 + ...+ A
n








Depending on the value of A1, three possible scenarios emerge:
• Shocks gradually die away: |A1| < 1 =⇒ |An1 | → 0 as n → ∞,
• Shocks never die away: |A1| = 1 =⇒ |An1 | = 1 ∀N , in which case the
Equation (3.5) transforms into yt = y0 +
∞￿
i=0
ut as N → ∞,
• Shocks magnify over time: |A1| > 1 =⇒ |An1 | > |An−11 | > ... > |A1|.
The model is stable only in the first case, i.e. all eigenvalues of A1 lie inside the
unit circle. Thus, VAR requires stationary time series. However, Sims (1980)
cites the danger of information loss as the case against differencing. More
specifically, he argues that VAR is created to capture the time series dynamics
and interaction between the variables, not to estimate the parameters. Further,
differencing obscures the co-movements among the series, i.e. omits possible
cointegrating relationships. On the other side of token, non-stationary series
may induce false relationships and spurious correlations. We decide against the
dogmatic approach, treating this issue on a case-to-case basis.
One of the key tenets of VAR analysis is invertibility condition (Wold rep-





which ensures that the forecast for any stationary process is produced by the
means of weighted average of past forecast errors. In lag notation, the equation
(3.7) reads
yt = (1 + ψL)
−1
￿t (3.8)
Under invertibility condition, (3.8) can be rewritten as
￿t = yt − ψyt−1 + ψ2yt−2 + .... (3.9)
The equation (3.9) holds if |ψ ≤ 1|, implying that the innovation term ￿t is a
function of the past values of observables yt. In the case of non-invertibility,
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the innovations from VAR will not match the shocks and pertinent responses
from an economic model.
Linear Impulse Response Function
Interpretation of structural VAR is hindered by a large number of coefficients.
Impulse response function (IRF) is a simple way of tracking the time path of
various shocks on the variables contained in VAR system (Enders 2004). To
illuminate the concept, consider the recursive form VAR. One off-unit shock
to ￿2t does not have a contemporaneous effect on yt, but is being transmitted
into ￿1t+1. Hence, contemporaneous shock in policy rate affects the inflation in
(t+1). Impulse response depicts the scale of this impact over a certain horizon.
In mathematical notation, IRF can be represented as the difference between
the two realizations of a conceptual experiment. In the first one, the system is
hit by a random shock at time t; whereas in the second, no shocks occur in the
time interval between t and (t+ n) (Koop et al. 1996):
Iy(n, ￿,ωt−1) = E[yt+n|Vt = ￿, ..., Vt+n = 0,ωt−1]− E[yt+n|Vt = 0, ..., Vt+n = 0],
(3.10)
where Vt is a random shock, ωt−1 represents the history of yt−1 up to (t − 1)
and n = 1, 2, 3, ....
Linear IRFs are symmetric and history independent, ωt−1 = 0. Wold decom-
position represents the innovation term as a combination of lagged observables;
hence the assumption of zero shocks in intermediate periods. Different values
of ￿ only rescale this measure, implying that the responses do not depend on
the sign or the size of shocks nor their history. Figure 3.1 illustrates the impulse
responses of AR(1) process to different values of an initial shock.6 It can be
inferred that the responses are symmetric in all instances.
IRFs are ill-suited to study the systems with changing dynamics. Nonlin-
ear models do not have a Wold representation; hence, the assumption of zero
shocks in intermediate periods would lead to inaccurate inferences. Further, the
reaction of regime switching systems to the same shock hinges upon the initial
conditions. As an example, consider the Threshold Autoregression (TAR):
∆yt = A1∆yt−1 + A2∆yt−1 + I(∆yt−1 ≥ 0) + Vt, (3.11)
6 The AR(1) process yt = 0.2yt−1 + ￿t was generated in EViews.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses, AR(1)





























where I(∆yt−1 ≥ 0) = 1 if ∆yt−1 ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. Define A = A1 +A2,
where 0 ≤ A ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ A1 ≤ 1. For a particular history ∆yt−1 and Vt = ￿,
two sets of impulse responses emerge:
(a) Iy(n, ￿,∆yt−1 = 0) = ￿
1−An+1
1−A if ￿ ≥ 0
(b) Iy(n, ￿,∆yt−1 = 0) = ￿
1−An+1
1−A1 if ￿ < 0
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse responses of TAR(1) with the coefficients
A1 = 0.9 and A2 = 0.3. The responses to positive and negative one-standard
deviation shocks are clearly asymmetric and of different magnitudes.
Linear impulse response fails to describe the effects of mutually correlated
shocks, which is referred as the composition effect property. In the system (3.1)
– (3.2), ￿1t and ￿2t are correlated, which induces contemporaneous effect of ￿1t
on both y1t and y2t. Hence, the responses depend on the composition of shocks,
rendering linear IRF inadequate.
Criticism
The appeal of VAR as an empirical tool vanishes in theory. Critics have ar-
ticulated its inability to recover the true structural relationships as the most
serious flaw. Canova (2006) argues that conventional identification restrictions
are created merely to facilitate an econometric calculation. As such, they are
disassociated from the structural models used for interpretation. On the other
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses, TAR(1)
























hand, capturing a variety of structural relationships accurately is daunting.
Proper VAR specification should reflect the theory as closely as possible, with-
out catering to the econometric convenience.
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2005) argue that potential non-invertibility may
discredit the model by generating large prediction errors. This case usually
applies if some variables are not observed. Briefly, let the equilibrium of an
econometric model have the following state space representation:
xt+1 = Axt +Bwt+1 (3.12)
yt+1 = Cxt +Dwt+1 (3.13)
where xt is the vector of states, yt is the vector of observable variables, wt is the
vector of economic shocks and D is a square matrix of full rank. The model
is invertible if the absolute values of eigenvalues of A − BD−1C are strictly
less than one.7 If invertibility condition fails, the impulse responses from state
space model do not match those from VAR representation.
SVAR models in finite samples may be unable to recover the true system
dynamics, even if the correct identifying restrictions are employed. This argu-
ment has been put forward by Chari et al. (2008), who find that SVAR fails
to recover impulse responses to technology shocks on the data generated from
multiple-shock business cycle models. Insufficient number of lags is cited as the
core obstruction to the model’s credibility. Including higher number of lags, on
7 For the proof, please refer to Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2005)
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the other hand, entails practical shortcomings: the model becomes highly pa-
rameterized, which requires long time series. Moreover, the presence structural
changes renders the parameter estimates unstable.
3.2.2 Selected Nonlinear Models
Unsatisfactory performance of Linear VAR in a variety of applications led to
the development of new econometric techniques. Before describing the Lo-
gistic Smooth Transition Vector Autoregression (LSTVAR) model, we present
the alternative nonlinear techniques which have been used to investigate the
monetary transmission mechanism.
Markov Switching Model
One of the initial attempts to address the issue of regime changes was Markov
switching model. System dynamics oscillates between the s1, s2,..., sn states.
State switches are governed by the Markov process :
P (yt+1 = si|y1, y2, ..., yt) = P (yt+1 = si|yt), i = 1, ..., n (3.14)
The equation (3.14) implies that the conditional probability distribution of fu-
ture states hinges only upon the current state, i.e. is conditionally independent
upon the past values. Hence, the forecast is based upon the current state and
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where Aij = P (yt+1 = sj|yt = si) is the transition probability between the
regimes i and j and
m￿
j=0
Pij = 1. The switches occur due to the movements of
unobservable variable. Parameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood
procedure. As far as our study is concerned, the model assumptions are at odds
with the dynamics of the Czech economy. More specifically, the structural
changes can be related to a particular sequence of events, which contrasts to
random state switches.
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Threshold Vector Autoregression (TVAR)
In TVAR, regime switches are governed by the motion of selected state variable.
A variation of this model, LSTVAR, allows for smooth transition between the
regimes. Dataset is split based on the threshold, with the impulse responses
computed for each subsample. This estimation strategy may have problematic
implications. Consider the model of economy with output, prices, interest rate
and credit. We may want to inspect the effectiveness of monetary policy in
expansion and recession separately. Accordingly, the impulse responses are
computed both for the recession and expansion subsample. However, TVAR
dismisses the time dimension, as the reaction of the economy to monetary
shocks may change over time. Thus, the estimates may be imprecise.
Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregression (TVP VAR)
Time-varying parameter Vector Autoregression (TVP VAR) model is a rela-
tively novel approach to monetary transmission modeling, emanating from the
development of Bayesian econometrics.8 Parameters of interest are taken as
the true values of random variables. Consequently, Bayesian econometrics fo-
cuses on their distributional properties. As of the TVP VAR, parameters are
allowed to change with each observation, usually following the random walk
assumption. This estimation strategy may render the model seriously overpa-
rameterized.
One of the initial attempts to model the monetary transmission within the
TVP VAR framework concerned the bad luck vs. bad policy question (Cog-
ley & Sargent 2001). The core shortcoming of this study is the assumption
of constant volatility of shocks, which neglects possible heteroskedasticity of
shocks and nonlinear relationships among the model variables. Later stud-
ies, most notably by Cogley & Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005), allow for
stochastic volatility of shocks and system nonlinearities. However, TVP VAR
demonstrates the evolution of impulse responses over time, without explicitly
indicating the impact of certain variables on monetary transmission.
3.2.3 The Basics of LSTVAR
Our model specification pertains to Logistic Smooth Transition VAR (LST-
VAR). The dynamics of LSTVAR oscillates between two different states. Tran-
8 Readers interested in this topic should consult Koop (2003).
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sition between the regimes occurs at a certain speed rather than abruptly. Im-
pulse responses are computed for each regime. This section presents our model
specification and outlines the pertinent simulation procedure.
The Model
In line with Weise (1999), we set up the following model:
Xt = X0 + A(L)Xt−1 + (θ0 + θ(L)Xt−1)F (zt) + ut, (3.15)
where Xt is an n× 1 vector of endogenous variables, A(L) and θ(L) are n× n
m-th order polynomials in the lag operator, ut are unobservable shocks with
variance-covariance matrix Ωt for t = 1, ..., T ; zt is the switching variable,
while F (zt) represents logistic function which governs the transitions between
the regimes. F (zt) is assumed to take the following form:
F (zt) = (1 + exp[−γ(zt − c)/σz])−1 − 1/2, γ > 0, (3.16)
where c is the threshold around which the system dynamics evolves, γ is the
”smoothness parameter”, while σz represents the standard deviation of the
switching variable. Function F (zt) is bounded between zero and one. In the
limit, four possible combinations emerge:
(a) (zt − c) → −∞ =⇒ F (zt) → 0 =⇒ linear model
(b) (zt − c) → +∞ =⇒ F (zt) → 1 =⇒ linear model
(c) γ → 0 =⇒ F (zt) → 1 =⇒ linear model
(d) γ → ±∞ =⇒ threshold autoregression with two regimes.
The parameter σz normalizes deviations of the zt from the threshold value and
is calculated as the standard deviation of the switching variable.
Pre-Testing for Nonlinearity
Prior to the actual estimation, one must establish whether the hypothesis of
linearity can be rejected in favor of nonlinear specification. The usual approach
is to conduct a grid search for potential threshold values, each time estimating
the selected model specification and computing the Lagrange Multiplier (LM)
test statistics on the restriction of equality between linear and nonlinear models.
Potential threshold values are selected from parameter space Γ = [z, ẑ], where
Γ is restricted to a sample range of the switching variable. Equation (3.15) is
then estimated for all the values from Γ.
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LM test posits the null hypothesis of coefficients’ stability across the sam-
ple, H0 : γ = 0, against the alternative H1 : γ > 0.9 Testing for non-
linearity in each equation separately is conducted in three steps. Assum-
ing that our initial model is the k-variable VAR with p-lags, where Wt =
(X1t−1, X1t−2, ..., X1t−p, X2t−1, ..., Xkt−p), the nonlinearity test is performed as
follows (Weise 1999):
(a) Calculate the restricted sum of residuals from the regression of explana-
tory variables on their lagged values










(b) Calculate the unrestricted sum of residuals from the regression of resid-
uals on lagged values of explanatory variables













(c) Compute the test statistics
LM = T (SSR0 · SSR1)/SSR0,
where T stands for the number of observations. Detecting nonlinearities in a
system of equations requires the application of log-likelihood test. Test formula-
tion is the same as previously: H0 : γ = 0 versus H1 : γ > 0 in all the equations.
Denote the estimated variance-covariance matrices of residuals from restricted









tively. The test statistics is defined as LR = T (log|Ω0|− log|Ω1|).
The testing procedure in both cases is tainted by a nuisance parameter
problem, as the threshold parameter is not identified under H0. Hence, the
test statistics conforms to probability distribution different than the χ2. The
bootstrap procedure to approximate the asymptotic distribution in a given
scenario is implemented in two steps. First, construct the artificial series by
estimating a baseline linear model and taking n draws from the residuals, where
9 Testing for γ = 0 entails an identification issue. In this case, γ would also take the
negative values. The shape of the transition function would switch around c, while the
parameters in θ(L) would simply adjust.
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n is the desired length of series; second, compute the F or LR statistics for each
of the series and comparing them to the actual data. The p-value is calculated
as the number of times the F or LR statistics from artificial series exceeded
the actual one, divided by one thousand (Weise 1999).
Optimal Threshold Value
If the linear specification is rejected, optimal threshold value is selected from
the aforementioned grid search. In order to ensure that the adequate number
of time series observations lies on each side of the threshold, the highest and
the lowest 15% observations are eliminated from the search. Upon estimating
the equation (3.15), optimal threshold and smoothness parameter are selected
as a combination of values which minimizes the log-determinant of variance-
covariance matrix of residuals S:
zopt = argminS(z), (3.17)
where z ∈ Γ.
Generalized Impulse Response Function (GIRF)
Shortcomings of linear IRF led to the development of its generalized version.
Generalized impulse response function (GIRF) is designed to capture the non-
linear system dynamics. Responses are conditioned on the sign, the size and
the history of shocks, while the endogenous regime switches throughout the
duration of response are allowed. Formal definition of GIRF from the equation
(3.10) applies, with the assumption ωt−1 ￿= 0.
Given that the nonlinear model is already specified, GIRF can be computed
using the Monte Carlo integration technique. The crux of this method is in
simulating different histories and shocks R times and taking an average. Koop
et al. (1996) propose the following procedure:
1. Pick a history ωt−1 and a random shock Vt = ￿. For ωt−1, the actual
values of lagged endogenous variables at a particular date are used.
2. For a given horizon N , randomly select (N + 1) × R values of K-
dimensional shock. The shocks are drawn with replacement from estimated
residuals of the model and assumed to be jointly distributed within one period.
Hence, if the date t shock is drawn, all residuals for that particular date are
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collected.
3. Simulate the evolution of endogenous variables: given the initial condi-
tions Vt and ωt−1, use the first N shocks to compute the realization y0t+n for
n = 1, ..., N .
4. Use the same draw of N random shocks plus one additional draw to
produce a realization y0t+n of the time series for n = 1, ..., N dependent on the
initial condition ωt−1.

















t+n(ωt−1), n = 0, ..., n (3.19)
By the Law of Large Numbers, these averages will converge to the conditional
expectations, E[Yt+n|vt,ωt−1] and E[Yt+n|ωt−1], required in the definition of
GIRF.
Simulation procedure poses the question of the nature of shocks. In our
original specification, we assumed that Vt = ￿ is a random shock, i.e. the
realization of the same stochastic process that generates yt, while the variables
generating history ωt−1 are arbitrary. Alternatively, the variables yt−p may be
assumed random, when we denote history Ωt−1. GIRF can be constructed as
one of the following combinations:
(a) Arbitrary current shock and arbitrary history:
GIy(n, δ,ωt−1) = E[yt+n|vt = δ,ωt−1]− E[yt+n,ωt−1], (3.20)
for n=0,1,...
(b) Random current shock and random history:
GIy(n, δ,ωt−1) = E[yt+n|Vt = δ,Ωt−1]− E[yt+n,Ωt−1], (3.21)
(c) Arbitrary current shock and random history:
GIy(n, δ,Ωt−1) = E[yt+n|vt =,Ωt−1]− E[yt+n,Ωt−1]. (3.22)
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3.3 Empirical Model of the Czech Economy
This section lays out the empirical model of the Czech economy. As part of our
estimation strategy, we consider various filtering methods and identification
schemes. An extensive description of the dataset is provided, along with the
corresponding transformations.
3.3.1 Filtering Method
Prior to the actual estimation, each series has been detrended using the Hodrick-




(yj − gj)2 + λ
N−1￿
j=2
(gj+1 − 2gj + gj−1)2, (3.23)
where yt is a cyclical component, defined as the difference between the original
signal xt and the smooth growth component gt. The first term is a measure
comparable to ”goodness-of-fit”, while the second term measures the ”degree of
smoothness”. Variable λ determines the trade-off between the two terms. The
respective values of λ = 1600 and λ = 14400 appear to be standard for quarterly
and monthly frequency data. Using the local linear trend model with stochastic
cycle and calibrated volatilities of components, Harvey & Jaeger (1993) demon-
strate that this particular value was tailored to approximate the US business
cycle. Specifically, it can be shown that the standard value λ = 1600 corre-
sponds to 39.4 months, which is a standard duration of US business cycle.10
Hence, uncritical application of the standard values may lead to inaccurate
inferences.
As of the Czech Republic, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding
the length of a cycle. The studies addressing this issue are scarce. Based on
the analysis of stylized facts, Hloušek (2006) finds that, since the beginning
of 1990s, at most two cycles can be identified. Poměnková & Maršálek (2011)
attempt to detect the cycle via turning points. However, the range of estimates
is wide: consumption cycle is found to last between 3.5 and 6.5 years, industrial
production between 1.75 and 7.75, while that of GDP is within 3.75 and 11.5
years. Albeit uncritical, we opt for the standard value (λ = 14400) to avoid
bias and ensure comparability with the existing studies.
10 For the proof, please refer to Kowal (2005).
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3.3.2 Identification
Following Mojon & Peersman (2001), we specify our benchmark model as fol-
lows:
KYt = A(L)Yt−1 +B(L)Xt + µt, (3.24)
where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables and Xt−1 the vector of foreign






Xt + ￿t, (3.25)
where A∗ = K−1A, B∗ = K−1B and ￿ = K−1µ. ￿ stands for reduced form
residuals, which will be used to recover the original shocks µ. The economy is
divided into domestic and foreign block, containing p1 and p2 variables respec-
tively. Foreign block is included in order to isolate the effects of foreign shocks
on economy and therefore, to avoid spurious correlations. In matrix notation,























where Aij(L) takes the dimensions p1 × p2. The study by Mojon & Peersman
(2001) examines the effects of monetary policy in different euro zone economies.
It is assumed that shocks emanating from small open economies (Austria, Bel-
gium and Netherlands) do not affect the EMU-wide fluctuations, while the
inverse relationship holds. Accordingly, the variables associated with EMU
economic activity become endogenous, but with an imposed block exogeneity
restriction. This restriction postulates that domestic endogenous variables do
not enter the foreign exogenous block either contemporaneously or with a lag
(A21 = 0). It has been applied in a number of studies on small open economies,
most notably by Cushman & Zha (1997) who explore the interactions between
US and Canadian economy. Further, it is routinely employed in the papers
on monetary transmission in CEE region (Maćkowiak 2005), (Horváth 2008a),
(Havránek et al. 2010).
In our baseline specification, vector of endogenous variables contains indus-
trial production, net price index, three-month money market rate, exchange
rate and total credit to residents and nonresidents:
Y1,t =
￿
ipt prt irt ert crt
￿
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while the exogenous block includes euro area output, aggregate price level and
euro area short term interest rate:
X1,t =
￿
ei gdpt ei prt ei irt
￿
It needs to be emphasized that the use of GDP per se in VAR analysis bears a
number of disadvantages. Giordani (2001) argues that the omission of output
gap as a forward-looking variable may spuriously produce the price puzzle.
Specifically, output gap enters the monetary policy rule, while the data on
output is not available at the time of monetary decision-making. Employing
the ex post series may therefore lead to incorrect identification of the response
of monetary policy variable to all the other shocks. Hence, we employ cyclical
component of GDP.
The crux of correct identification of monetary shocks is the identification
scheme. In a benchmark study on VAR analysis, Sims (1980) proposes recursive
ordering and Cholesky identification scheme. Some studies argue that this
particular scheme may not be entirely plausible for a small open economy.
Assuming that the variables are ordered as in Yt and Xt, we combine the
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The interpretation of the identification scheme above is essentially the same
as in the case of Cholesky decomposition. However, several important changes
emerge. First, monetary authorities react to exchange rate fluctuations (k67 ￿=
0). Borys et al. (2009) make the same assumption in the study on the Czech
monetary transmission. Second, monetary authorities are assumed to respond
contemporaneously to changes in industrial production (k64 ￿= 0). A rationale
behind is that the excess industrial production indicates excess demand, which
prompts monetary authorities to react (Borys et al. 2009). Finally, contempo-
raneous reactions to the price level are ruled out, as the deviation of forecast
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from the target actually enters the monetary policy reaction function. The first
three rows are related to the conduct of euro area monetary policy.
Our benchmark model is similar to that in Havránek et al. (2010), with
a slightly modified identification scheme. However, our dataset is longer and
spans until 2012:M3. The initial exercise, therefore, is to estimate the model
over a longer sample, replacing GDP with the industrial production. Next, we
evaluate the impact of monetary shocks using generalized impulse responses.
This strategy should be more informative, as GIRF is insensitive to ordering
and allows for endogenous shocks throughout the duration of the response.
3.3.3 Caveats
The use of this particular identification scheme in LSTVAR has an important
caveat: overparameterization. In the two regime specification, the number of
estimated parameters doubles in comparison to Linear VAR. Hence, for a model
with eight variables and two lags, the number of estimated parameters would
be 8×2×2 = 32. Our dataset contains 171 observations, which would imply a
substantial loss of the degrees of freedom. Thus, we need to specify the model
in a more parsimonious manner.
Studies employing some version of TVAR generally resort to four- or five-
variable specification. Three and four variables are typically used in the papers
analyzing the threshold effects in large economies. Weise (1999) employs the
first differences of logs of industrial production index, consumer price index and
M1 on a US sample spanning the 1960:Q2-1995:Q2 period. This specification
is convenient, albeit impractical for our purposes. First, exchange rate omis-
sion would be a serious error, due to its relevance in a small open economy.
Second, the use of M1 as a measure of monetary policy stance is flawed, as
the CNB’s main tool is the two-week repo rate. Furthermore, M1 is not in-
dicative about the credit demand, which would taint our estimation procedure.
Next, Atanasova (2003) employs a four-variable specification on UK sample
(1984:M1-2002:M4), including the annual growth of industrial production in-
dex, annual change of the retail price index, M2 and the measure of credit
market conditions. The use of M2 as a monetary policy variable is flawed as
well. M2 is to a large extent determined by the demand for credit, which in-
duces endogeneity in monetary policy reaction. Thus, monetary policy shifts
cannot be detected unambiguously. Atanasova provides justification that the
three-month money market rate produces the price puzzle. Contrary to this,
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benchmark studies on the Czech monetary transmission mechanism find no ev-
idence of the price puzzle. Hence, the use of M2 would be unreasonable. Some
studies acknowledge the downsides of this particular strategy, simultaneously
employing the interest rate and some measure of monetary aggregate (Karamé
& Olmedo 2002; Shen & Chiang 1999). More recent studies by Fuchun (2010)
and Jääskelä (2007) on Canada and Australia respectively employ a parsimo-
nious four-variable specification, containing output growth, price level, some
measure of credit market conditions and interest rate.
Studies on the threshold effects in small open economies generally employ
five variables. Standard model variables comprise output growth, price level
and interest rate. Importantly, neither of the studies available omits the ex-
change rate. The papers by Bordon & Weber (2010) and Bathaluddin et al.
(2012) on Armenia and Indonesia respectively estimate the regime switching
models without exogenous variables. Saxegaard (2006) adopts similar spec-
ification for Subsaharan Africa, employing an exogenous variable only if its
economic relevance is overarching. For instance, oil price and aid-to-GDP ra-
tio are included as exogenous variables for Nigeria and Uganda respectively.11
Contrary to these, Çatik & Martin (2012) employ a five-variable baseline spec-
ification and three exogenous variables (oil price, US output and US interest
rate) when analyzing the monetary transmission in Turkey. However, their es-
timation sample spans a relatively long period (1986:M1-2010:M11), rendering
the inclusion of the aforementioned vector plausible.
3.3.4 LSTVAR Specification
We now outline the estimation strategy for LSTVAR model. The model is
specified following the discussion on potential caveats and usual practice con-
cerning the small open economies. To the best of our knowledge, no resembling
analysis for CEE region has been pursued, which rules out a comparable spec-
ification. We include the vector of endogenous variables as above. Vector of
exogenous variables is left out. Hence, the new identification scheme is modified
11 Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa.
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Again, non-policy block contains output and price level, implying that the
monetary policy affects these variables only with a lag. Policy block consists
of exchange rate and credit. Monetary authorities react to contemporaneous
exchange rate fluctuations, but not to price level changes due to the inflation
targeting horizon, which is between 12 and 18 months.
3.3.5 Dataset
Our sample is restricted to the 1998:M01-2012:M03 period, as the year 1998
coincides with the establishment of full-scale inflation targeting. Switch from
fixed exchange regime may have changed the structural relationships among the
variables, which could result in misleading conclusions. Industrial production
(seasonally adjusted), money market rate (three-month) and monetary aggre-
gate M2 are obtained from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS).
CNB’s official monetary policy instrument is the two-week repo rate; how-
ever, it is discontinuous and inconvenient for the purpose of our study. In-
stead, we use the three-month money market rate, which is the practice em-
ployed in mainstream studies on the Czech monetary transmission mechanism
(Arnoštová & Hurńık 2005; Borys et al. 2009; Havránek et al. 2010; Franta
et al. 2012). Monetary aggregates do not appear as overly relevant for the
conduct of the Czech monetary policy.
Price level is approximated by the net price index, which is available only
internally at CNB. This measure excludes regulated prices. EUR/CZK nom-
inal exchange rate and GDP are retrieved from the Eurostat database. Since
the GDP series are available only at quarterly frequency, we interpolated them
using the quadratic-match average procedure. Variable total credit to resi-
dents and nonresidents is obtained from CNB’s public database ARAD, while
the stock price index is downloaded from Prague Stock Exchange. All three
exogenous variables – euro area GDP, price index and money market rate are
retrieved from the Eurostat database. The exact description of the dataset is
provided in Table A.1. Figure A.1 shows the logarithmized time series.
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3.4 Results
This section presents the results and discusses their potential pitfalls. We first
estimate the Linear VAR applying two different identification schemes. The
series were further tested for the presence of threshold. In the case no threshold
can be detected, Linear VAR is more efficient.
3.4.1 Linear Specification
Our first Linear VAR specification contains vectors of endogenous and exoge-
nous variables as outlined in the Section 3.3.2. The model is estimated using
detrended variables and the strategy outlined above. We choose the lag length
of two, as suggested by the Final Prediction Error (FPE) and Hannan-Quinn
(HQ) information criteria. Other criteria suggest higher lag order, which would
be impractical in the model with eight variables and 171 observations. AR roots
of characteristic polynomial lie inside the unit circle, indicating that the spec-
ification is stable.12
The results are presented in Figure A.3. We compute both orthogonalized
and generalized impulse responses. As of the former, one Cholesky monetary
policy innovation is associated with the fall in prices and credit and exchange
rate appreciation. The response of industrial production is not clear: in the
wake of monetary tightening, it appears to rise, declining after roughly seven
months. Wide confidence bands indicate that this response is associated with a
very high degree of uncertainty. Prices fall immediately, bottoming out around
the fifteenth month. Exchange rate overshooting is evident: following monetary
contraction, exchange rate appreciates (reaching the peak after 2-3 months),
gradually depreciating afterwards. Credit declines as well, with the bottom
between five and ten months.
Different identification scheme notwithstanding, our results roughly con-
firm previous findings on the Czech monetary transmission, most notably from
Borys et al. (2009) and Havránek et al. (2010). The inclusion of a turbulent
2009-2012 period does not alter the impulse responses considerably. This is
consistent with Franta et al. (2012), who find that the Czech output and prices
are becoming increasingly responsive to monetary policy shocks. Such a result
is attributed to anchored inflation expectations and financial deepening. In
comparison to Arnoštová & Hurńık (2005), no evidence of a price puzzle is re-
12 The output is available upon request.
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ported. This is probably due to the longer sample and the fact that we exclude
pre-1998 period from the analysis.
Next, we compute the generalized impulse responses. GIRF circumvents
the issue of identification and is therefore expected to provide more robust re-
sults. As stressed in the methodological section, when one variable is shocked,
others are allowed to vary as implied by covariance. Mean impulse response
function is calculated based on a certain number of simulations. In the context
of our model, no substantial difference is reported: the responses to monetary
tightening are in line with those previously reported. Some confidence bands
are narrower, probably reflecting more realistic assumptions.
For more information on the interaction between various series, we perform
the Granger causality test (Table A.3). The results are not interpreted as hints
about the true causal relationship, but rather as the contribution to forecast
of some particular variable. Credit seems to predict the interest and exchange
rate, which is in line with our ordering scheme. Interest rate does not predict
prices and industrial production in the current period, which is also consistent
with the ordering. As far as the foreign variables are concerned, euro area
GDP predicts industrial production at a 99% confidence level. The same can
be stated about the euro area and domestic price level. No similar relationship
is found between the foreign and domestic interest rate.
Variance decomposition is telling about the impact of foreign variables. We
present the estimates in Figure A.4. Euro area GDP explains up to 40% of vari-
ation in domestic industrial production and 20% of variation in domestic price
level. Another 20% of price fluctuations is explained by the euro area price
level. Finally, 20% of credit variance is attributed to changes in the euro area
GDP. Overall, foreign developments are fairly relevant for the Czech economy.
This intuitive result is consistent with the findings reported in other relevant
studies. Maćkowiak (2005) decomposes the sources of variation in aggregate
output and prices for the three CEE countries – Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland, finding that 30% of output and 35% of price variation in the Czech
Republic can be attributed to foreign shocks. Next, Jiménez-Rodriguez et al.
(2010) address the impact of foreign shocks on key domestic variables in CEE
economies, finding that positive commodity price shock has a significant posi-
tive effect on industrial production and price level in the Czech Republic.
3. Monetary Transmission Asymmetries in the Czech Republic 43
Further, positive shock to foreign industrial production boosts the domes-
tic industrial production, yielding a considerable exchange rate appreciation.
Similar results are reported in Havránek et al. (2010).
The specification above produces estimates consistent with the theory and
other studies. Due to the severe overparameterization, it is impractical in the
context of LSTVAR. Hence, we estimate VAR(2) employing the identification
scheme described Section 3.3.4 (Figure A.5) Impulse responses are somewhat
counterintuitive: monetary shock appears to boost the industrial production,
which declines slightly between the seventh and the tenth month and rises
again. Prices fall immediately, but rise above zero already in the second month,
declining again to bottom out around the fifteenth month. There is some ev-
idence of an exchange rate puzzle; however, exchange rate appreciates soon
after the monetary tightening. LSTVAR specification yields even more puz-
zling results: industrial production does not decrease over the response horizon.
Similar situation is with the prices. Credit and exchange rate react roughly as
described by the theory.13 It is worth emphasizing that the impulse responses
are fairly similar under the two regimes, implying the absence of a clear thresh-
old effect. Clearly, these results are dubious and not in line with the relevant
studies.
A number of explanations can be put forward. First, as outlined above
and proven in different studies, foreign shocks do have a profound impact on
the Czech economy. Their omission represents a serious drawback of our par-
simonious specification. The results also deviate from what has been found
about other small open economies. However, the studies in question have been
conducted for the countries with different economic structure than the Czech
Republic and employed somewhat different estimation strategies. For instance,
Çatik & Martin (2012) and Bordon & Weber (2010) explore monetary trans-
mission in the context of prior- and post-reform setting for Turkey and Armenia
respectively. In both cases, the threshold is clearly detectable around the time
of policy switch. On the other hand, we restrict our sample to post-1998 pe-
riod, which corresponds to the adoption inflation targeting. Next, Saxegaard
(2006) employs involuntary excess liquidity in the banking sector as a thresh-
old variable. In the context of Subsaharan Africa, the justification is that the
excess liquidity held in the banking sector bears inflationary potential, hence
invalidating the effects of monetary policy. This would be unreasonable in our
instance, as the Czech banking sector is subject to a set of macroprudential
13 The output is available upon request.
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rules and heavily supervised. Further, CNB has managed to anchor the infla-
tion expectations, thereby gaining a high degree of credibility. Our specification
is nearly identical to that in Jääskelä (2007) and Fuchun (2010); however, Aus-
tralia and Canada are large economies of a different structure, which renders
different results.
We attempt to solve this issue by augmenting the model with one additional
variable. Degrees of freedom are being further restricted, albeit not substan-
tially. Hence, we need to pick a variable exerting a strong influence over the
Czech economy and/or excellent forecasting performance. World commodity
price index is frequently used; however, it does not change our results consider-
ably. Stock price index may meet these requirements, since they are believed to
be determined by the macroeconomic fundamentals. As such, they are highly
sensitive to macroeconomic and changes in future economic prospects. More-
over, in a small open economy, stock prices might reflect the prospect of external
changes, which would later impinge on the real economic activity. Havránek
et al. (2010) provide evidence of a consistently good forecasting ability of PX
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The model is estimated on two lags, as suggested by the LR, AIC and SC
information criteria (Table A.2). Engle-Granger coinegration test suggests the
absence of long-term relationship among the variables. Stationarity is not ex-
plicitly tested for, as AR roots of characteristic polynomial lie inside the unit
circle (Figure A.2). Impulse responses are presented in Figure 3.3. Industrial
production slightly rises at the beginning, declining around the fifth month to
bottom out between the tenth and the fifteenth. It subsequently rises and dies
out by the end of forecasting horizon, which comprises 60 months. Again, the
response over the first ten months is surrounded by a high degree of uncer-
tainty. In comparison to the previous specifications, the response of industrial
production is equally ambiguous. Notably, there is essentially no evidence of
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a price puzzle. Exchange rate appreciates, while the stock prices and credit
fall in the wake of monetary tightening. Overall, these results corroborate the
findings from the other studies.
3.4.2 Nonlinear Specification
Our next venture is to test for the presence of nonlinearities in the system
above. If no nonlinearities are detected, LSTVAR is redundant. The number
of lags is based on conventional lag length criteria, i.e. we apply the same lag
as in baseline linear specification.
Pre-Testing for Nonlinearities
We test the null hypothesis of linear specification against the alternative. Since
the probability distribution is different than χ2, we apply the bootstrap pro-
cedure described in Weise (1999). Bootstrapped p-values are reported in the
Table 3.1. The first five columns indicate test statistics for each equation sep-
arately at different lags of the transition variable, while the last one is related
to the system as a whole.
Table 3.1: Lagrange Multiplier test for nonlinearity
Transition Dependent variable
variable ip pr ir er cr LR
ipt−1 0.9017 0.6935 0.9617 0.9632 0.9956 0.0009
ipt−2 0.7742 0.9733 0.9763 0.9619 0.9892 0.0194
prt−1 0.4794 0.9131 0.8083 0.0922 0.5881 0.0141
prt−2 0.5633 0.9234 0.2596 0.0101 0.8521 0.0110
irt−1 0.9610 0.9629 0.9972 0.9996 0.6844 0.0000
irt−2 0.8516 0.7134 0.9992 1.0000 0.8483 0.0000
ert−1 0.9989 0.9105 0.9996 0.9996 0.9999 0.0001
ert−2 0.9994 0.9426 0.9999 0.9998 0.9997 0.0000
crt−1 0.7089 0.5811 0.9480 0.3469 0.7504 0.0001
crt−2 0.0694 0.5812 0.7243 0.3384 0.8642 0.0001
LM test: H0: Linear equation vs. H1: Nonlinear equation
LR test: H0: Linear system vs. H1: Nonlinear system
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Credit
When the second lag of credit is used as the transition variable, the hypoth-
esis of linearity is rejected for industrial production at 90% level. Intuitively,
when the system is shocked, credit acts to induce the nonlinear response of
industrial production. We also find evidence of nonlinearity in exchange rate
equation when the first and the second lag of price level are used as the tran-
sition variables. LR test detects nonlinearity in the system for each of the
transition variables considered. However, in all the other cases, it is impossible
to identify in which particular equation the nonlinearity occurs. We acknowl-
edge that this may be indicative of omitted variable bias, which we attempt
to alleviate in further sections. For now, we inspect crt−2, prt−1 and prt−2 as
potential transition variables.
Optimal Threshold Value
The combination of optimal threshold and smoothness parameter value is se-
lected using the grid search procedure described above. In the instance when
crt−2 is employed as the transition variable, the optimal combination of thresh-
old and smoothness parameter is (0.0265, 1.4576). These values are significant
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at 99% level. When prt−1 and prt−2 are used as the switching variables, the
optimal combination in both cases is (0.0068, 0.4775). However, neither of
them is significant (p-values are 0.4775 and 0.3663 respectively). Conducting
the grid search over entire range of the price variable, i.e. including the extreme
15% values is highly indicative. For both prt−1 and prt−2, the optimal thresh-
old value shifts to 0.0204. This observation is in the upper 3% extreme, which
entails an important conclusion: price level threshold in the Czech Republic
is too high to be of a practical importance. This finding should not be inter-
preted in a sense that the Czech economy behaves linearly. It should rather
imply that the price level does not compromise the effectiveness of monetary
policy, whereas the same may not be true about the credit growth. In line with
the test results, our selection of the threshold variable pertains to crt−2.
As a way of judging the sensitivity of estimates, Weise (1999) suggests es-
timating the equation (3.15) employing the threshold specification (γ → ∞).
Threshold values remain unchanged in all instances.
We present the motion of credit variable with respect to threshold in Figure
3.4. Credit was over the threshold in periods 2001:M1-2001:M8 and 2007:M1-
2009:M4. This finding is in line with the major developments in the Czech
financial system. Banking sector was hit by a deep crisis during between 1997
and 1999, when the share of non-performing loans reached 30% (Frait et al.
2011). In a restructuring period, most of the banks were acquired by EU fi-
nancial groups. Consequently, more loans were extended to the households and
credit growth picked up sharply in 2001. Credit was also close to the threshold
prior and immediately upon the EU accession, but did not cross it. Between
2001 and 2008, household borrowing displayed a high growth rate, which was
not the case with the corporate sector. Further, a negligible share of FX loans
did not expose banks to the exchange rate risk. Finally, the funding was gen-
erally provided on the basis of domestic deposits instead of foreign sources.
All these factors acted in conjunction to prevent the scale of credit crunch
comparable to that in some other CEE economies. Credit variable crossed the
threshold in 2007:M1 and remained firmly above until 2009:M4. In line with
the fact that no large-scale credit crunch took place, it fell below the threshold
only in 2009:M5, with no profound deviations from the trend.
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Figure 3.4: Transition variable path


























We proceed with the LSTVAR estimation, which is suggested as optimal by the
LM test and the detection of threshold value. This empirical exercise attempts
to capture the asymmetries in the Czech monetary transmission. To test for
the threshold effects, we compute the generalized impulse responses for two
different scenarios, when the economy starts under and above the threshold.
Regime switches are allowed throughout the duration of response, while the
coefficients are changing accordingly. Responses from two different regimes,
along with the corresponding 90% confidence bands are presented in Figure
3.5. To discern between the effects of one Cholesky monetary policy innova-
tion, selected responses at different horizons are provided in the Table 3.2.
The sign of the responses computed from LSTVAR specification is some-
what counterintuitive. Monetary shock induces a rise in industrial production
in both regimes. However, this should not be perceived as an anomaly of
LSTVAR, considering the fact that the resembling response was evident in all
previous Linear VAR specifications. It should be noted that the smallest puz-
zle occurred in the specification containing a block of foreign variables. This
reflects the importance of external factors in the dynamics of the Czech econ-
omy. In our case, when the economy is initially below the threshold, industrial
production declines in the fifth month, reaches the bottom in the eleventh and
gradually dies out afterwards. This picture is different if the economy starts off
above the threshold: it rises more than in the previous scenario and falls below
zero only slightly around the fifteenth month. Negative response is deeper in
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses from LSTVAR, high vs. low credit growth, 90%
confidence intervals
(a) Industrial production
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the former case, which indicates the presence of a threshold effect. Further,
confidence bands are much wider in the latter case. Apart from more uncer-
tainty under the high credit growth, this is also indicative about the lower
number of observations pertaining to this particular regime. Unlike all previ-
ous specification, a large price puzzle emerges. The puzzle is evident in both
regimes, albeit more under the high credit growth. Consequently, the decline
in prices is relatively higher in a low growth scenario, which reflects the pres-
ence of a threshold effect. Importantly, the confidence bands are narrower than
those of an industrial production. Large puzzle is clearly an anomaly, which
we attempt to explain further.
Table 3.2: Selected responses to +1 S.D. shock, high vs. low credit growth
Industrial Price level Exchange rate
production
Horizon 6 m. 12 m. 6 m. 12 m. 6 m. 12 m.
Linear -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0018 0.0000
Low growth -0.0003 -0.0025 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0047 -0.0005
High growth 0.0015 -0.0011 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0048 -0.0033
The response of interest rate and stock prices to a monetary policy shock
in the two regimes largely overlaps. This finding suggests that the reaction
of monetary authorities to accelerated credit growth is not nonlinear. More
specifically, if the credit growth passes a certain threshold, CNB does not raise
the interest rate disproportionately. However, Vaš́ıček (2011) suggests that
the monetary policy rule under the conditions of financial distress is nonlin-
ear. Resembling reaction of stock prices to a monetary tightening in the two
regimes indicates that the investors do not account for possible threshold ef-
fects. Namely, monetary tightening is expected to have uniform effects on the
economy, regardless of the degree of credit growth.
As far as the exchange rate is concerned, appreciation is evident under both
credit regimes. In a high growth regime, it hovers close to zero in the first four
months, subsequently declining and bottoming out around the ninth month.
However, the confidence bands are relatively wide. This scenario is somewhat
different in a low regime, where the exchange rate firmly appreciates in th first
few months. There is no considerable difference in the maximum degree of
appreciation. Finally, the response of credit is above zero in the first three
months. Afterwards, it decreases and dies out in about two years. This reac-
tion is deeper of the economy is initially below the threshold.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse responses from LSTVAR, positive vs. negative shock, 90%
confidence intervals
(a) Industrial production
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Next, we test for the relative effects of expansionary and contractionary
monetary shocks. In both instances, the economy starts off below the thresh-
old. The responses to expansionary monetary shock are rescaled by (-1) to en-
sure comparability. Figure 3.6 indicates no significant differences in the effects
of positive and negative shock. The impulse responses of all variables in the
two scenarios largely coincide, along with the confidence bands. Timing of the
responses is similar as previously. Industrial production initially rises, falling
below zero in the seventh month and bottoming out in the twelfth. Price puz-
zle emerges, with the prices reaching the bottom around the fifteenth month.
Strong exchange rate appreciation is evident in the first six months, followed
by gradual depreciation. Stock prices remain firmly below zero throughout the
duration of the response. Finally, credit is positive in the first three months,
gradually declining afterwards.
Further Discussion
Comparison of the results from Linear VAR and LSTVAR is indicative about
the peculiarities of generalized impulse responses. First, the fall in industrial
production in Linear VAR is roughly between the two impulse responses from
LSTVAR. However, the initial rise in LSTVAR is considerably higher. The
same can be stated about the price level. Importantly, price puzzle from Linear
VAR is almost negligible. Confidence bands of industrial production response
are much wider in LSTVAR, whereas those of price level are comparable. Stock
prices display somewhat stronger responses in LSTVAR. Exchange rate and
credit react similarly across the two specifications. Further, the reaction of
an interest rate is stronger in nonlinear model. It is worth noting that in all
instances, impulse responses become insignificant after roughly 30 months.
Interpretation of the results warrants further discussion on the essence of
generalized impulse responses. The first simulation is performed by drawing
a random vector of shocks from regression residuals and propagating them
through the system. In the second simulation, the same vector is used, plus
additional perturbation which is constructed from structural shock to the se-
lected variable using the recursiveness assumption. The difference between
these two simulations represents generalized impulse response (Mandler 2010).
This procedure is repeated for each regime using 1000 draws of random shocks.
Hence, the interaction of shocks throughout the duration of response is allowed,
which may magnify the effects of an initial one. Considering that the initial
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responses of industrial production and price level in Linear VAR are slightly
above/close to zero, the simulation procedure described above might have mag-
nified them, producing anomalies in LSTVAR. Similarly, this may be the reason
behind somewhat deeper reaction of stock prices in LSTVAR.
We further draw a comparison between our results and other studies em-
ploying some version of threshold specification. In the study by Çatik & Martin
(2012), the link between interest rate and prices in Turkey appears to be bro-
ken in a pre-reform period (prior to 2004). Its disappearance in the ensuing
period is explained by the less accommodative monetary policy. However, it
is worth reiterating that this study uses a long data sample and three exoge-
nous variables, which may result in more reliable estimates. In the post-reform
period, monetary tightening is followed by the initial output increase. The au-
thors justify this by a shorter sample period and therefore, less precise finding.
This claim very well applies to our analysis. Nearly all the responses die out
around the twenty-fifth month, which resembles our results. In a similar vein,
Bordon & Weber (2010) document the price puzzle on Armenian sample span-
ning between 2006:M1 and 2010:M5. An abundant evidence of price puzzle is
reported in Bathaluddin et al. (2012) as well. In spite of relatively long sam-
ples, studies on UK and US are no exception in terms of reported anomalies.
Atanasova (2003) documents persistent rise in UK inflation three months upon
the monetary contraction. Karamé & Olmedo (2002) report weakly function-
ing monetary transmission in US during recessions. A more recent study by
Mandler (2010) lends support to this finding. However, one should not dismiss
the fact that all of them employ relatively parsimonious specifications.
Our finding of symmetry related to the direction of shock corroborates other
studies. The concept of sign-related asymmetries is theoretically appealing;
however, the supporting empirical evidence arises only under the certain condi-
tions. Atanasova (2003), Weise (1999) and Mandler (2010) find sparse evidence
of asymmetries in the effects of positive and negative shocks. In TVAR specifi-
cations by Balke (2001) and Calza & Sousa (2005), asymmetries disappear once
the nonlinear impulse responses are allowed for. Asymmetries have been de-
tected in the studies by De Long & Summers (1988), Cover (1988) and Thoma
(1994). However, if one controls for policy shifts, no evidence of asymmetries
can be established (Weise 1999; Ravn & Sola 1999). Our analysis satisfies both
conditions: we allow for nonlinear responses and include the post-1998 period
only. Sensibly enough, positive and negative shocks have symmetric effects.
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Several issues deserve further discussion. First, there is an obvious trade-off
between the parsimonious specification and the efficiency of estimates. This
is evident in the context of both large and small open economies. The issue
becomes more pronounced in the latter case, as the small economies typically re-
quire the inclusion of the variables capturing external developments. Jarociński
(2008) notes that, due to short sample periods, the existing VAR studies for
post-communist countries are sensitive to small changes in specification and
suffer from a high degree of uncertainty. To alleviate this problem, he suggests
pooling the available information on different countries. We attempt to con-
duct such an analysis on a panel of CEE economies in the following chapter.
Next, VAR analysis is consistently plagued by the price puzzle. Employing
a large meta-analysis, Rusnák et al. (2011) find several possible explanations
of this phenomenon. First, some publication bias is evident against the studies
reporting the long run puzzle. In a short run, there is a profound uncertainty
regarding the duration of monetary transmission itself. Moreover, cost channel
theory implies that the firms’ optimal response to a monetary tightening are
higher prices, due to their dependence on credit. Hence, there is some theoret-
ical justification for an initial rise in prices. On the other hand, price puzzle is
predominantly related to model misspecification - omission of the commodity
price index, output gap or the use recursive identification scheme.
Finally, Égert & MacDonald (2008) underline potential dysfunctionality
of the broad credit channel in CEE countries. The practice of raising the
funds publicly is severely underdeveloped, which gives banking sector a certain
monopoly. Hence, higher degree of financial distress could act as a powerful
propagator of monetary shocks. This is not the case in reality, as the banks and
other financial corporations can circumvent domestic constraints by borrowing
from their mother companies. On the other hand, parent institutions are sub-
ject to the credit channel in euro area, which is still insufficient to render it
operative in CEE region.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
To check for the robustness of our findings, we employ two different specifica-
tions. In the first one, industrial production is replaced with GDP. Quarterly
series were converted to a monthly frequency using the quadratic-match pro-
cedure. Number of lags and identification scheme remain the same as above.
The results are presented in Figure A.6 and Figure A.7. Our results remain
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robust to the specification including GDP. The responses of variables to all the
shocks largely coincide to those in the previous specification. Monetary policy
shock has a negative impact on GDP, price level, stock prices and credit, while
the exchange rate appreciation is evident. This impact is stronger under the
conditions of restricted credit. On the other hand, impulse responses to posi-
tive and negative shocks are largely symmetric.
Our second robustness check employs different detrending technique. Specif-
ically, we use the HP filter but for the time frequency of 60 months. This dura-
tion of the Czech business cycle is in line with Poměnková & Maršálek (2011).
Further, different identification scheme is employed: exchange rate is ordered
after the policy rate, implying that monetary authorities do not affect it con-
temporaneously. The results presented in Figure A.8 and Figure A.9 largely
correspond to our initial results: monetary policy loses its clout in a high credit
growth regime, whereas the effects of positive and negative shocks display no
asymmetries.
Chapter 4
Financial Structure and Monetary
Transmission in CEE Region
This chapter is an attempt to model monetary transmission asymmetries for
CEE region. As emphasized previously, short sample periods plague individ-
ual country findings by a high degree of uncertainty. Further, the use of total
credit as a sole measure of financial conditions may be deficient. Henceforth,
we attempt to remedy for the flaws of one-country analysis. Using the sample
of eight CEE states – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, we quantify the contribution of financial struc-
ture to the overall effectiveness of monetary policy. To capture macrofinancial
linkages in a more comprehensive manner, we construct two indicators of fi-
nancial structure – credit dependence and banking sector competition.
4.1 Stylized Facts
Banking sector in CEE region has been changing rapidly since mid-1990s.
Three crucial evolutionary factors included structural reforms, credit boom and
post-2008 credit crunch. This section presents a short theoretical background
and some of the pertinent stylized facts, which place our further analysis in the
context.
Theoretical literature tends to ascribe credit booms to financial deepening
or financial accelerator mechanism. Specifically, economic growth is believed to
create a higher degree of financial intermediation. The exact causal relationship
is unclear, however, as more financial services may contribute to the economic
growth. As of the financial accelerator mechanisms, credit expansion emanates
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from over-optimism about future earnings, which increases the collateral value
and consequently, borrowing capacity.
Over the past decade, CEE region underwent a period of rapid credit
growth. The ramifications of a consequent downturn were profound, but di-
vergent across the countries. Acknowledging peculiarities of individual credit
developments, a few region-wide tendencies can be identified. First, credit
growth picked up around 2000, which coincides with the end of major struc-
tural reforms and more robust economic growth. Second, the severity of credit
crunch differed based on the soundness of banking sector and FX exposure. We
analyze these facts below.
Financial system in CEE economies is predominantly bank-based, with the
banks owning roughly 85% of total financial sector assets (Égert et al. 2006).
Another important observation is that the vast majority of banks is foreign-
owned, whereas the share of state-controlled entities is low to negligible.1 Capi-
tal markets remain underdeveloped as compared to the euro zone. Hence, credit
is the major source of financing. Private credit-to-GDP ratio in Figure 4.1 re-
veals a more nuanced picture. Between 2003 and 2008, credit growth reached
very high levels in Estonia and Latvia. Slovenia and Hungary exhibited similar
pace, albeit this ratio remained somewhat lower. Credit expansion remained
subdued in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, with some acceleration
visible in 2007-2008.
Dissecting the total private credit into corporate and household loans re-
veals that the corporates were equally avid borrowers (Figure 4.2). The average
corporate credit-to-GDP ratio ranged between 14% in Poland to 50% in Slove-
nia. Household lending was predominantly mortgage-based in the Baltics, the
Czech Republic and Hungary. On the other hand, Poland, Slovenia and Slo-
vakia extended more consumption-related loans.
The share of FX loans in some economies was substantial (Figure 4.3). This
phenomenon was pronounced in the Baltic states and Hungary, whose mone-
tary frameworks rested on exchange rate targeting or currency board regimes.
On the other side of the spectrum, FX loans remained negligible in the Czech
Republic. Another important development pertained to the cross-border lend-
ing. As an outcome of financial integration, a number of countries encountered
high portions of direct foreign lending, which is visible from the Figure 4.4.
Again, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia stand out as the exceptions.
Foreign currency borrowing was the most accelerated in a mortgage segment,
1 As an exception, the largest Polish bank (PKO BP) is majority state-owned.
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Figure 4.1: Domestic credit to private sector (in % of GDP)!"##$%
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Figure 4.2: Household vs. corporate credit, 2003-2008 averages!"##$%
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Figure 4.3: Share of FX loans within the banks’ household loan portfolio,
2003 vs. 2008
Although the quality of the household credit
portfolio has been deteriorating, the proportion of
non-performing loans remains low in regional
comparison
There was a moderate deterioration in the quality of
the household portfolio by the end of 2008. Within
loans to households, the proportion of loans over 90 days
overdue rose during the year, while a similar increase in loans
overdue for 30-90 days also suggests further deterioration.
The adverse impact of provisions on profits also increased
slightly in 2008 (see Chart 2-22), but risk premia still provide
adequate coverage despite the increase in funding cost.
Strong growth in FX lending in previous years has
increased risks to financial stability. The HUF-FX
interest margin stemming from high risk premia, coupled
with stable exchange rates and strong credit supply led to
households predominantly becoming indebted in foreign
currency in recent years. As a result, the proportion of FX
loans is currently over 70 per cent (see Chart 2-17). As the
majority of customers failed to consider exchange rate risks,
the lack of natural hedge makes them extremely vulnerable to
changes in the HUF exchange rate. It follows that a
permanently weak forint increases the probability of defaults.
Moreover, the banks are passing the higher funding costs on
customers, which also increase debt service burden and
probability of default in the future.
The total value of new foreign currency loans is
significantly lower. Tighter conditions in foreign funding
and difficulties in FX financing through FX swaps have had
a significant impact on both the dynamics of household
borrowing and the composition of household new debt over
recent months. Borrowing in foreign currency has fallen
markedly. By contrast, there has only been some minor
decline in borrowing in HUF. This is a positive development
from a financial stability perspective, as it reduces the share
of foreign currency loans in household debts, albeit slowly.
Furthermore, since November 2008 within the new FX
lending the euro has been gaining ground against the Swiss
franc (see Chart 2-18). This process is favourable from the
financial stability point of view, because it contributes to the
decrease of FX loan proportion in the total households’
loans, however slowly and on a long-term basis. 
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Chart 2-16
Distribution of the domestic housing stock based on
its encumbrance with mortgage collateral
25%
13%63%
Dwellings used for housing loans
Dwellings used for home equity
Dwelling not used as a collateral
Source: MNB estimate.
Chart 2-17
Share of FX loans within the banks’ household loan
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Chart 2-18
Composition of new household loan contracts of
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Figure 4.4: International vs. local currency claims as a share of total foreign
claims, 2003-2008 averages !"#$%&'(
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due to the fact that long-term rates remained prohibitively high in some of the
countries. In the context of our analysis, it is worth emphasizing that cross-
border lending dampens the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Credit crunch which unfolded after 2008 was unprecedented in scale. First,
as a result of global downturn, parent institutions faced liquidity shortages,
which induced lending cuts in the region. Second, foreign currency lending
stumbled due to the fall in demand and exchange rate depreciation. Baltic
states and Hungary were the most adversely affected, in line with the peculiar
credit developments. Some turbulence notwithstanding, the Czech Republic,
Poland and Slovakia displayed a remarkable degree of resilience.
Market structure is an important determinant of banking sector trends.
Banking sector competition indicators (Figure 4.5) reveal rather different cross-
country developments. Herfindahl-Hirschman index indicates that Estonian
and Lithuanian banking sectors are strongly concentrated.2 In these countries,
five largest banks hold 95% and 85% of total bank assets respectively (Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs Directorate General 2010). Slovenia is above the
average, whereas Hungary and Poland remain below. Latvia, Slovakia and the
Czech Republic display similar trends. High net interest margin confirms weak
competitive pressures in the Estonian market.3 Lower concentration notwith-
standing, the margin remained firmly above the average in Hungary, probably
reflecting higher premiums from 2006 onwards. Poland is also somewhat above
the other economies, although with a decline evident from 2006. No large-scale
differences across the remaining countries can be discerned.
4.2 Literature Survey
This section expands evidence on the conjunction between financial structure
and monetary transmission. Following the discussion in the Section 2.1.1, we
survey the literature on interest rate channel in CEE region. We emphasize
that very few studies compare the actual strength of transmission channels
across the region, which hinders our interpretation of results.
In one of the early studies, Kot (2004) establishes empirical relationship
between the interest rate pass-through and the degree of banking sector com-
2 Herfindahl-Hirschman index measures the banks’ asset size in relation to an entire
industry.
3 Net interest margin is defined as the difference between lending and borrowing interest
rate, divided by interest-bearing assets.
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petition for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Transmission in all
three countries is regarded as sluggish and incomplete. Higher degree of com-
petition may not enhance the interest rate pass-through, considering the fact
that Poland and Hungary exhibit more competitive banking sector and weaker
pass-through than the euro zone. Égert et al. (2007) compare the interest
rate pass-through in CEE-5 and selected euro-area economies. The repercus-
sions of monetary policy on long-term market rates are found to be weak,
due to a highly volatile yield curve. Overnight rates are generally insulated
from monetary policy shifts, while the pass-through strengthens for long-term
deposit rates. Further, corporate lending rates are less rigid than the house-
hold rates. Individual country pictures are more nuanced. Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Hungary exhibit little or no pass-through to household lending
rates. Mortgage-related rates are versatile in Slovenia and Spain. Finally, in
the case of Germany and Poland, the transmission to deposit rates is more
pronounced than for lending rates. In a more elaborate study, Égert & Mac-
Donald (2008) summarize all available findings on CEE region and calculate
the average pass-through to a range of rates. The strongest pass-through is
detected for short- and long-term corporate lending rates, while that to the
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consumer loans is weak. Higher responsiveness of corporate rates may emanate
from the tighter competition in the sector of corporate banking. This is in line
with Demel & Sikimic (2008), who document a highly competitive market for
small- and medium-enterprise loans. As of specific countries, the pass-through
is high in the Baltics and low in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The results
for Hungary and Poland are less clear-cut. It is worth highlighting that in
CEE-5, the strength of transmission gradually diminishes.
The importance of credit in the economy can be examined through the func-
tioning of monetary transmission channels. Strong amplification of monetary
shocks through the components of credit channel indicates high relevance of
the bank credit. Studies addressing this issue for CEE region are numerous.
General support for the operativeness of credit channel notwithstanding, the
scope of these papers does not allow us to draw overarching conclusions about
each specific country.
Matousek & Sarantis (2009) test for the effectiveness of bank lending chan-
nel on a sample of eight CEE economies for the 1994-2003 period. Bank lend-
ing channel is found to be functioning in all the states, albeit considerable
cross-country differences can be detected. Size and liquidity appear to play an
important role in banks’ response to a monetary policy shock. Aggregate loan
supply is found to have a positive and significant effect on the real economic
activity, which is telling about the importance of bank credit in CEE region.
Elbourne & De Haan (2006) expand the aforementioned sample with Romania
and Bulgaria to examine the conjunction between financial structure and mon-
etary transmission. Employing three broad indicators of financial structure -
indicators for the importance of small banks, health of the banking system and
availability of alternative sources of financing, the study finds correlation only
between the second indicator and the strength of monetary transmission. No
systematic relationship of monetary transmission with banks’ size and compe-
tition from other forms of finance is detected.
Summarizing evidence on individual countries is tedious, partly due to dif-
ferent time spans and a wide variety of econometric techniques employed. Early
evidence is plagued by a high degree of uncertainty. Wróbel & Paw￿lowska
(2002) find that the credit channel in Poland is generally operative, while the
interest rate pass-through is comparable to that of the euro zone. Further,
it is demonstrated that higher concentration in the banking market entails
slower pass-through for the lending rates, but increases it for the deposit rates.
Matousek & Sarantis (2009) pinpoint capitalization as a determinant of bank
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lending channel in Poland. This bolsters the finding of Wróbel & Paw￿lowska
(2002), who argue that monetary contraction primarily affects poorly capital-
ized banks. In a more recent study, ￿Lyziak et al. (2008) contest the previous re-
sults by delivering mixed evidence on the effectiveness of credit channel. Firms’
balance sheet amplifies the effects of monetary shocks, but only weakly. Loan
supply is almost unresponsive to monetary policy shifts, which is explained by
the behavior dubbed as ”buffer-stock”. Namely, banks hold a high amount of
liquid assets, which allows them to reduce the supply of short-term loans and
insulate the portfolio of investment loans.
Horváth et al. (2004) examine the functioning of interest rate channel in
Hungary, finding that the speed and completeness of pass-through to corporate
deposits and loans are considerably higher than to the household instruments.
As of the former, faster short-term and more complete long-term adjustment
is evident. Specifically, 70% of an interest rate shock is transmitted in the first
period of adjustment. This finding is attributed to a more intense competition
in the corporate banking sector. In spite of this, corporate loan rates exhibit
downward rigidity. Concerning the credit channel, Horváth et al. (2006) report
that bank size, liquidity, capitalization and foreign ownership do play a role in
the transmission of monetary shocks, albeit some of the findings are not robust
across different specifications. Foreign-currency denominated corporate loans
are fairly unresponsive to monetary policy changes. This contrasts to Matousek
& Sarantis (2009), who document sparse evidence on the bank lending channel
in Hungary.
Concerning the Czech Republic, the study by Fidrmuc et al. (2008) offers a
degree of support for the operativeness of the balance sheet channel. In one of
the earliest studies on the interplay between monetary policy and banking sec-
tor, Pruteanu (2004) argues that the Czech bank lending channel was weakly
operative between 1999 and 2001, which coincides with the period of banking
sector restructuring. Contrary to these findings, Matousek & Sarantis (2009)
find that size, capitalization and liquidity are significant in all periods. How-
ever, their relative importance is difficult to asses. No unanimous conclusions
about Slovakia can be drawn, since their distinctive bank features do not ap-
pear robust as factors of monetary transmission across different specifications.
Ahtik (2012) finds evidence of a functioning bank lending channel in Slovenia.
More profitable, liquid and deposit-funded banks are less responsive to policy
changes. The impact of size is uncertain, whereas that of capitalization is not
robust across specifications. In the context of our analysis, subsidiaries of for-
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eign banks tend to be somewhat isolated from the impact of monetary policy.
Finally, higher concentration is found to debilitate the efforts by monetary au-
thorities.
The evidence on the credit channel in the Baltics is mixed. Köhler et al.
(2005) find that small and well-capitalized banks react more intensely to a
restrictive monetary policy. However, liquidity and capitalization appear to
have counter-balancing effects, which renders the final impact of monetary pol-
icy indeterminate. In this context, Égert & MacDonald (2008) argue that the
bank-level capitalization may not matter due to the fact that leverage of an
entire system exerts the influence over the process of monetary transmission.
The relevance of bank lending channel vanishes under the conditions of abun-
dant foreign lending: in Köhler et al. (2005), euro money market rate turned
out to be a highly significant determinant of bank lending behavior, which was
not the case with domestic money market rate. Hence, high share of FX loans
retards the effectiveness of monetary policy. Beņkovskis (2008) concludes on
a similar note: albeit some evidence on the bank lending channel is present,
FX loans are mostly unresponsive to policy changes. However, Juks (2004)
demonstrates that this channel was functional prior to 2003, which coincides
with the onset of excessive rise in foreign lending.
4.3 Methodology
Panel estimation techniques are tailored to provide a richer knowledge about
cross-sectional and time-specific dynamics. With this additional information,
one is able to obtain more efficient parameter estimates. Panels are used more
avidly in microeconomics, typically by pooling a large number of cross-sectional
units over a short period of time. Conventional estimation techniques are thus
based on the properties of microeconomic panels. This is somewhat inappropri-
ate in the context of macroeconomic panels, where the number of cross-sectional
units tends to be small, while the time span is somewhat longer. This section
is designed to put forward the major issues related to the macroeconomic pan-
els and present Panel Conditionally Homogenous Vector Autoregression model
(PCHVAR), which is employed as an estimation tool. For the sake of brevity, we
do not discuss the problems related to the consistency of parameters. Readers
interested in this topic should consult the standard textbook by Canova (2007)
or Smith & Fuertes (2010).
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Table 4.1: Literature overview
Study Country Issue Findings
Kot (2004) CEE-3 vs. Transmission and Weaker pass-
euro zone bank competition through in CEE-3
Elbourne & CEE Financial stru- Weaker banks
DeHaan (2006) cture and mo- enhance the
netary transmission transmission





Égert & CEE Interest rate Weak in the
MacDonald (2008) channel Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Hungary;
strong in the Baltics;
ambiguous in Poland
and Slovenia
Matousek & CEE Bank lending Generally operative
Sarantis (2009) channel
Wróbel & Poland Credit channel Generally operative
Paw￿lowska
￿Lyziak et al. (2008) Poland Credit channel Weakly operative,
mainly due to a
high liquidity of
the banks
Horváth et al. (2004) Hungary Interest rate Downward rigid
channel corporate rates,
otherwise operative
Horváth et al. (2006) Hungary Bank lending Generally operative,
channel but FX loans
almost unresponsive
Fidrmuc et al. (2008) Czech Republic Balance sheet Generally operative
channel
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Study Country Issue Findings
Pruteanu (2004) Czech Republic Bank lending Dysfunctional
channel between 1999
and 2001




Köhler et al. (2005) Baltics Bank lending Almost non-
channel functional, due to
a high share of FX
loans
Beņkovskis (2008) Latvia Bank lending Relatively
dysfunctional
Juks (2004) Estonia Bank lending Generally fu-
channel nctional up to
to 2003
4.3.1 Introduction to Dynamic Macro Panels
Consider the panel consisted of i = 1, ..., N cross-sectional, t = 0, ..., T time





Ajyi,t−j + ￿it, ￿it
i.i.d.∼ (0,Σ￿), (4.1)
where yit is a K × 1 vector of endogenous variables and Aj is a K × K ma-
trix of coefficients. The key assumption is convergent cross-sectional dynamics,
which entails homogenous slope coefficients. Individual-specific effects are usu-
ally captured by the time-invariant fixed or random effects. This estimation
procedure is common in microeconomic research (Canova 2007).
The aforementioned restriction does not hold in a macroeconomic setting.
Cross-sectional units are typically subject to different policies, whose rami-
fications need to be evaluated. Resorting to fixed effects in this instance is
problematic. Consider the equation




Ajyi,t−j + Ap+1ρi + ￿it, ￿it
i.i.d.∼ (0,Σ￿), (4.2)
where ρi represents the unobservable (unit-specific) effects. Allowing for het-
erogenous intercepts ρi while the slope homogeneity is still present yields serial
correlation among the residuals, which results in inconsistent estimates (Sá
et al. 2011). Heterogeneity bias may be resolved employing a mean group
estimator, which estimates the time- and unit-specific parameters:
￿it = µi + λt + vit. (4.3)
Here, µi represents unit-specific fixed parameter, λt stands for time-specific
fixed parameter, while vit is the remainder effect. Depending on the magnitude
of vit, dynamics may remain heterogenous even upon controlling for time- and
unit-specific effects. Another problem is that heterogeneity vit is treated as a
nuisance. Thus, the mean group estimator does not lend itself to an individ-
ual country analysis. Clearly, we need a specification which allows to make
inferences about the sources of heterogeneity, simultaneously exploiting the
poolability of the data.
4.3.2 The Model
Following Georgiadis (2012a), we set up the Panel Conditionally Homogenous





Aj(zit)yi,t−j + ￿it, ￿it
i.i.d.∼ (0,Σ￿), (4.4)
where i = 1, 2, ..., N denotes cross-sectional and t = 1, 2, ..., T time units, yit is
a K×1 vector of endogenous variables, zit is a M×1 matrix of exogenous vari-
ables, ￿it is a vector of serially uncorrelated reduced-form disturbances, while
Aj represents the K ×M coefficient matrix.
The model above is the generalized version of Panel VAR from equation
(4.1). Unlike the regular Panel VAR, the specification in (4.4) allows for dif-
ferent cross-sectional dynamics, but only to the extent of divergences in each
unit’s observed heterogeneities. To restate, the time series are pooled, but im-
pulse responses differ based on the values of exogenous conditioning variables
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zit. Hence, this specification is indicative about the role of individual structural
characteristics in observed heterogeneities. Similarly as the transition variable
in LSTVAR, zit is an essential determinant of model’s dynamics.
The solution and the corresponding impulse response computation closely
follow Georgiadis (2012a). Let aj,sm(zit) be the scalar coefficients from Aj(·),
where j = 1, 2, ..., p, s = 1, 2, ..., K and m = 1, 2, ..., K. Assume that each
scalar coefficient can be approximated by a scalar polynomial in the condition-
ing variable zit:
aj,sm(zit) ≈ π(zit)γj,sm, (4.5)
or, in the case of several conditioning variables, by a multivariate polynomial
π(zit), which can be obtained as a Kronecker product of two univariate poly-
nomials in the conditioning variable:





j (zji,t−1), ..., π
(τj)
j) (zji,t−1)], j = 1, 2 (4.7)
where π(zit) = [π1(zit), π2(zit), ..., πτ (zit)] is a 1× τ vector with polynomials in
zit and γj,sm = (γj,sm1, γj,sm2,...,γj,smτ )
￿ is a τ×1 vector of polynomial coefficients.4





































= Γ · [IK ⊗ π￿(zit)]. (4.8)
4 We may try to preserve the degrees of freedom by dropping the interaction terms
between conditioning variables and obtaining the following approximations: π̃(zit) · γj,sm =
[1, π̃1(z1i,t−1), π̃2(z2i,t−1)] · γj,sm and π̃(zji,t−1) = [π(1)j (zji,t−1), ...,π
(τj)
j (zji,t−1)], j = 1, 2.
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Γjxi,t−j + ￿it = ΓjXi,t−1 + ￿it, (4.9)





￿ and Γ = (Γ1,Γ2, ...,Γp). For the
estimation purposes, the equation (4.9) can be rewritten as:
Y = Γ ·X + E, (4.10)
where
Y = [y11, y1T , ...yN1, ..., yNT ](K×NT ),
Γ = (Γ1,Γ2, ...,Γp)K×pKτ ,
X = [X10, X11, ..., X1,T−1, ..., XN0, XN1, XNT ]pKτ×NT ,
and
E = [￿11, ￿12, ..., ￿1T , ..., ￿N1, ￿N2, ..., ￿NT ]K×NT .
Equation (4.10) in its vectorized form is:
y = (X ￿ ⊗ IK) · γ + ￿, (4.11)
where y = vec(Y ), ￿ = vec(E) and γ = vec(Γ). The OLS estimators are given
by:
Γ̂ = Y X ￿(XX ￿)−1 (4.12)
γ̂ = [(XX ￿)−1X ⊗ IK ] · y. (4.13)
When allowing for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, ￿it
i.i.d.∼ (0,Σ￿,i), GLS
estimation yields:
γ̂ = [(X ⊗ IK)S−1(X ￿ ⊗ IK)]−1(X ⊗ IK)S−1y, (4.14)
where
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To investigate the properties of impulse responses in PCHVAR model, we
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which is equivalent to
Yit = A(zit) · Yi,t−1 + Eit. (4.15)
Recursive substitution into the equation (4.15) gives:















Pre-multiplying the left side by JK = [IK , 0, ..., 0] gives the following:












· J ￿K · JK · Ei,t−j





i,t−j) · ￿i,t−j, (4.17)




i,t−1 = [zit,i,t−2, ..., zi,t−j]. (4.18)
Therefore, the impulse responses are obtained from matrices:
Φj(z
(j)





· J ￿K , (4.19)
which implies that they are both history dependent and functions of the condi-
tioning variables. Hence, we resort to the computation of generalized impulse
responses.
4.4 Empirical Model of the CEE Economies
4.4.1 Data
Our sample period spans between 1999:Q1 and 2009:Q4. Prior years witnessed
high volatility and the adoption of new monetary policy frameworks. A danger
of spurious correlations and misleading conclusions motivates our decision to
restrict the sample. Post-2009 period is not considered, due to the issue of data
availability.
Our specification is parsimonious and includes real GDP (gdp), price index
(pr) and a three month money market rate (ir). All series were detrended
using the HP filter (λ = 1600). We acknowledged the drawbacks of using
generic values of λ in the Section 3.3.1. However, in an eight-country sample,
with uncertain length of business cycles, standard value is the most sound
solution. The series were retrieved from IMF International Financial Statistics
(IFS) Database. Detailed description of the dataset is provided in the Table
B.1.
In line with Georgiadis (2012b), we construct two indices aimed at reflecting
the country’s financial structure: credit dependence (imp) and banking sector
competition (comp). Credit dependence is calculated by averaging series on
bank credit relative to deposits and private credit relative to GDP. Assuming
that more competitive banking sector features low interest margin and low
costs, we construct the latter variable by averaging series on net interest margin
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and bank overhead costs to total assets.5 The data on financial structure was
obtained from World Bank Financial Structure Database (Beck et al. 2009).
The series were converted to quarterly frequency using the quadratic-match
procedure.
The newly constructed variables are plotted in the Figure 4.6. Individual
country trends correspond to the stylized facts outlined in the Section 4.1.
We observe an increasing credit dependence in all the countries since 1999.
This ratio remains firmly below average in the Czech Republic, Poland and
Slovakia throughout the period. On the other hand, it is rather high in Esto-
nia and Latvia. The latter index indicates low competition at Hungarian and
Estonian banking markets. This emanates from the high concentration in Esto-
nian market and peculiarities of Hungarian banks, which charge high premium
and simultaneously incur high overhead costs. The market appears somewhat
less competitive in Poland, albeit no large-scale differences with the remaining
countries are detected. The presence of trend in credit importance variable
is evident in all the countries. Similarly, banking sector competition tightens
across the sample, with the exception of Estonia and Hungary. We acknowl-
5 For the estimation purposes, this series was subsequently inverted to ensure that higher
values reflect more strenuous competition.
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edge that the trend may plague our results by a higher degree of uncertainty;
however, HP detrending of the four variables financial above is theoretically
unappealing. Instead, we normalize the series to ensure cross-country compa-
rability. Further, we attempt to validate the results using modified series.
The example of Estonia exposes the pitfalls of our analysis. High credit
dependence ought to amplify the effects of monetary policy shocks, while low
competition might dampen them. For technical reasons, a number of other
relevant factors is not explicitly included, foreign lending being the most im-
portant one. Eventual impact of monetary policy may therefore be difficult to
estimate.
4.4.2 Estimation Strategy
We recover the original shocks from reduced-form residuals using Cholesky de-
composition. GDP is ordered first, followed by price index and interest rate.
As outlined in the Chapter 2, this particular ordering implies that monetary
authorities respond to contemporaneous changes in GDP and price level. How-
ever, no influence over their current values is exerted.
Our first venture is to estimate Linear VAR for each country in the sample.
To test for the impact of monetary policy under distinct financial structures, the
aforementioned financial variables are included as exogenous variables. Vectors













































PCHVAR estimation is pursued employing both univariate and bivariate
conditioning. In the former instance, impulse responses are computed over the
grid of values of credit dependence and banking sector competition variables
separately. Univariate conditioning hints about the role of one particular com-
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ponent of financial structure in monetary transmission. On the other hand,
bivariate conditioning captures the interaction between two variables, render-
ing it indispensable for the purpose of more profound analysis. Impulse re-
sponses are computed by fixing one conditioning variable, while computing the
responses over a grid of values of the remaining one.
4.4.3 Results
We first estimate the Linear VAR for each country in the sample. The estima-
tion is carried out with the detrended variables and one lag. Bearing in mind
the degrees of freedom restrictions, this particular lag length is selected to en-
sure cross-country comparability. AR characteristic polynomial roots indicate
that all the country-specific models are stable.6
Single-country estimation output is given in the Figure B.1. Inspection of
the impulse responses gives some preliminary insights about the role of finan-
cial structure in monetary transmission. Drawing uniform conclusions about an
entire sample is tedious, however. GDP responds negatively to monetary tight-
ening in most of the countries. An exception is Slovakia, where this reaction
is positive. GDP tends to bottom out between the fifth and the tenth quar-
ter. The maximum response of GDP is comparable between the five countries,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia being an exception. In the latter subsample, the
response is small or insignificant. It is worth noting that in the cases of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, the impulse responses do not die out completely even af-
ter 30 quarters. However, the confidence intervals are fairly wide. Resembling
impulse responses of prices are evident, again with the exception of Poland,
Hungary and Slovakia. Prices in Slovakia fall in the wake of monetary con-
traction; however, they bottom out almost immediately to return back to zero
fairly quickly. No considerable differences in terms of interest rate responses
can be detected.
Next, we test for the impact of financial structure variables on monetary
transmission within the framework of PCHVAR. The model is estimated on
one lag, merely to conserve the degrees of freedom and ensure comparability
with Linear VAR. Stability is not explicitly checked for; however, in our base-
line model, impulse responses die out after a certain period. This observation
represents an indirect proof of stability.
6 These results are available upon request.
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Impulse responses obtained from PCHVAR are by no means indicators of
the overall effectiveness of monetary policy. Instead, they merely demonstrate
what the cross-country differences in monetary transmission would be if they
diverged in one particular aspect of financial structure, everything else be-
ing the same. Our estimation begins with the univariate conditioning. Im-
pulse responses are generalized, which provides additional information about
the interaction between the series, without imposing severe restrictions on the
coefficients. Impulse responses from Figure 4.7 indicates that the reaction of
GDP, prices and interest rate strengthens at higher values of credit dependence
variable. Further, we can infer that at the very low values of this variable, mon-
etary transmission breaks down. On the other hand, impulse responses over
the grid of banking sector competition in the Figure 4.8 are counterintuitive:
more strenuous competition appears to dampen the effects of monetary policy
on both GDP and prices. Its potency increases with the decline in competitive
pressures.
We discus the results in the context of interest rate and credit channel.
Higher importance of credit tends to amplify the effects of monetary shocks.
Our results are in line with this observation. Credit dependence is the highest
in the Baltics, followed by Slovenia and Hungary. Indeed, Köhler et al. (2005)
and Beņkovskis (2008) argue that this particular feature fosters the bank lend-
ing channel in the three Baltic states. Similar claim has been made for Slovenia
(Ahtik 2012) and Hungary (Horváth et al. 2006). On the other hand, ￿Lyziak
et al. (2008) argue that high liquidity in the Polish banking sector renders this
channel dysfunctional. The evidence on the Czech Republic is less clear-cut.
Credit dependence index is among the lowest in the sample. Counterintuitively,
Fidrmuc et al. (2008) and Matousek & Sarantis (2009) find that both balance
sheet and bank lending channel are operative. However, their practical rele-
vance is not evaluated. Contrary to these, Niedermayer (2008) notes that the
interest rates on mortgage loans tend to be fixed, which may render less respon-
siveness to policy rate shifts in the banking sector. It is worth highlighting that
the cross-country comparisons on the extent of credit channel functionality are
inherently difficult to draw. For more intuition, we turn to analyze the other
results.
Mainstream theoretical studies suggest that higher degree of competition
fosters monetary transmission. Our results do not corroborate with observa-
tion. However, we do not diverge considerably from the other studies on CEE
region. Competition index indicates that the Czech Republic, Slovenia and
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Slovakia have the most competitive market, followed by Lithuania, Latvia and
Poland, while Estonia and Hungary are at the bottom. Some positive cor-
relation between the competition and the pass-through notwithstanding, Kot
(2004) finds that Poland and Hungary exhibit higher degree of competition and
weaker pass-through than the euro zone average. Hence, this mechanism may
not be entirely operative. Next, Égert et al. (2007) and Égert & MacDonald
(2008) provide evidence of a weak pass-through in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, which is contrary to that in the Baltics. The results for Hungary are less
clear-cut. Horváth et al. (2004) argue that the interest rate channel in Hun-
gary is functional, in spite of downward rigidity of the corporate rates. Égert
& MacDonald (2008) indicate that the pass-through to household lending rates
is weak. Thus, the ultimate repercussion of competition on monetary policy
may be difficult to evaluate. The results for Slovenia are ambiguous across
the studies. Further, Baltic states and Hungary have relatively higher share of
corporate loans, which are more sensitive to policy shifts.
Policy advice on one particular aspect of financial structure may be of a lim-
ited relevance, due to the fact that different policy measures act in conjunction.
Specifically, different components of financial structure may offset each other,
which has implications on previously discussed results. Consider the cases of
Estonia and Latvia. In 2008, credit-to-GDP ratio reached 91.9% and 89.6%
respectively, which is an indicator of high credit dependence. This, combined
with the high share of corporate loans and negligible government presence in
the banking sector, ought to increase the leverage by monetary authorities.
However, foreign subsidiaries, which own nearly 100% of the domestic banks,
may circumvent the effects of monetary contraction by borrowing from the
mother companies. All these factors, combined with a high concentration and
high amount of foreign lending, render the eventual impact of monetary policy
unclear. On the other side of the spectrum, the Czech Republic is the least
credit dependent country, which impedes the functioning of monetary policy.
However, negligible foreign lending and a relatively low share of corporate loans
ought to bolster its effectiveness.
The role of financial structure in monetary transmission therefore needs to
be evaluated employing a range of indicators. In the context of PCHVAR,
such an estimation may be technically difficult to carry out. Hence, we resort
to bivariate conditioning, as described in the Section 4.3.2. In comparison
with the previous scenario, the results presented in Figure B.3 and Figure
B.2 provide a different picture. Impulse responses computed over the grid of
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banking sector competition variable, while credit dependence is fixed at mean,
indicates negligible divergences in monetary transmission at different values.
The picture is nearly the same when impulse responses are computed over the
grid of credit dependence variable. In both instances, GDP bottoms out around
the eighth and prices in the tenth quarter. The responses die out between
the fifteenth and the twentieth quarter. As discussed in the Chapter 3, price
puzzle probably emerges due to the fact that no variables capturing external
developments have been included.
The above presented results yield an important conclusion: when interacted
with each other, different values of credit dependence or banking sector com-
petition do not alter the effectiveness of monetary policy. This confirms our
previous suspicion that various components of financial structure have a mutu-
ally offsetting impact, leveling off the cross-country variability. Assenmacher-
Wesche & Gerlach (2008) put forward the same conclusion in the context of
OECD economies: Panel VAR does not implicate the financial structure as a
significant determinant of monetary transmission, which is precisely due to the
counterbalancing effects described above. We acknowledge that our findings
are contestable. Specifically, the indicators of credit dependence and competi-
tion are constructed as a combination of two different time series. As Elbourne
& De Haan (2004) argue, this procedure is of subjective and ad hoc nature,
which may generate misleading conclusions. However, conclusions based on
individual components of financial structure are of a limited informative value,
as the ultimate impact of policy needs to be evaluated.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We perform the sensitivity check with annual time series. In the first part,
financial variables were interpolated from annual to quarterly frequency. We
acknowledged potential pitfalls of our strategy above. However, this decision
was based on the fact that the annual sample is too short, which may substan-
tially restrict the degrees of freedom and render imprecise impulse responses.
The results of univariate conditioning are presented in Figure B.4 and Fig-
ure B.5. Monetary transmission appears more potent under the conditions of
higher credit dependence and weaker competition. This finding broadly con-
firms our initial results. It should be noted that the impulse responses at very
low levels of each variable do not die out. This is indicative about sparsely
populated grid space in this region. Hence, these particular responses may
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be imprecise. Next, the results also hold for bivariate conditioning: the re-
sponses are broadly uniform across the grid of values of conditioning variables.
However, a slight increase in the strength of response can be observed at very
low values of competition. Although this finding may look counterintuitive,
we have demonstrated that different segments of financial structure interact
with each other, which may result in unexpected responses. Moreover, the ul-
timate impact of monetary policy should be judged using a variety of financial
structure indicators. In this instance, the unobserved component (high share
of FX loans, predominant foreign ownership) works to diminish the effects of
monetary policy in the economies characterized by strong competition.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied monetary transmission asymmetries in CEE region.
The first part is focused on the Czech Republic. Using the Logistic Smooth
Transition Vector Autoregression (LSTVAR) model for the 1998:M1-2012:M3
time span, we investigate the effectiveness of monetary policy at different stages
of the credit cycle. In the second part, the role of financial structure in mone-
tary transmission is examined. This analysis is conducted within the framework
of Panel Conditionally Homogenous Vector Autoregression (PCHVAR) model,
on a sample of eight CEE economies – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia for the period spanning be-
tween 1999:Q1 and 2009:Q4.
The main conclusions are as follows. First, credit cycle determines the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy in the Czech Republic. Credit growth above the
threshold is found to impair the monetary authorities’ leverage. To rephrase,
in the environment of abundant credit liquidity, agents have sufficient funds
to counter the negative effects of monetary contraction. On the other hand,
deteriorating financial conditions amplify the effects of monetary tightening.
No asymmetries in relative effects of contractionary and expansionary shocks
have been documented. This may emanate from the fact that our sample en-
compasses a single monetary policy regime, i.e. post-1998 period. Our results
indicate that the broad credit channel in the Czech Republic is operative.
Second, certain aspects of financial structure may induce monetary trans-
mission asymmetries. Higher credit dependence is found to foster the interest
rate pass-through in CEE region. On the other hand, monetary policy appears
less potent if the banking sector competition is strong. This is clearly counter-
intuitive, as more strenuous competition ought to result in more susceptibility
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to the outside pressures. However, individual country experiences are more
nuanced. Hungary and Estonia have the least competitive banking market,
but also a high share of corporate loans, which are more sensitive to monetary
policy shifts. On the other side of the spectrum, the Czech Republic has a
competitive market with a lower share of corporate loans.
Third, the ultimate impact of financial structure on monetary transmission
is indeterminable. When the credit dependence and the banking competition
are interacted with each other, the evidence of asymmetries largely disappears.
Again, individual experiences are revealing. Baltic states are highly dependent
on credit, which makes them more susceptible to monetary actions. On the
other hand, their banking markets are very concentrated. More importantly,
these countries engaged in excessive FX borrowing, over which the domestic
monetary authorities have virtually no influence. Therefore, the individual
components of financial structure may offset each other’s effects.
The ultimate role of financial structure in monetary transmission is difficult
to asses for three reasons. First, capturing its segments in a comprehensive
manner is tedious. Second, few econometric techniques have been developed
for this type of research. Further, mutual effects of monetary and pruden-
tial policies need to be examined. Considering its incontestable importance
in policy-making process, the research on financial structure needs to address
these issues.
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Égert, B. & R. MacDonald (2008): “Monetary Transmission Mechanism in
Central and Eastern Europe: Surveying the Surveyable.” OECD Economics
Department Working Papers 654, OECD Publishing.
Ehrmann, M., L. Gambacorta, J. Mart́ınez Pagés, P. Sevestre, &
A. Worms (2001): “Financial Systems and the Role of Banks in Mone-
tary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area.” Working Paper 105, European
Central Bank.
Bibliography 86
Elbourne, A. & J. De Haan (2004): “Asymmetric Monetary Transmission
in EMU: The Robustness of VAR Conclusions and Cecchetti’s Legal Family
Theory.” CESifo Working Paper Series 1327, CESifo Group Munich.
Elbourne, A. & J. De Haan (2006): “Financial structure and monetary pol-
icy transmission in transition countries.” Journal of Comparative Economics
34(1): pp. 1–23.
Enders, W. (2004): Applied Econometric Time Series. Wiley, second edition.
Farinha, L. & C. Robalo Marques (2001): “The Bank Lending Channel
of Monetary Policy: Identification and Estimation Using Portugese Micro
Bank Data.” Working Paper 102, European Central Bank.
Fernández-Villaverde, J., J. F. Rubio-Raḿırez, & T. Sargent (2005):
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trum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung.
Koop, G. (2003): Bayesian econometrics. Wiley.
Koop, G., H. M. Pesaran, & S. M. Potter (1996): “Impulse response
analysis in nonlinear multivariate models.” Journal of Econometrics (74):
pp. 119–147.
Kot, A. (2004): “Does Banking Sector Competitiveness Affect Interest Rate
Pass-Through?” Paper presented at the 3rd Macroeconomic Policy Research
Workshop on October 29-30, 2004. National Bank of Hungary.
Kowal, P. (2005): “Matlab implementation of commonly used filters.” Econ-
WPA Computer Programs (0507001).
Kwapil, C. & J. Scharler (2006): “Limited Pass-Through from Policy to
Retail Interest Rates: Empirical Evidence and Macroeconomic Implications.”
In “Monetary Policy & the Economy,” volume Q4
06, pp. 26–36.
Lo, M. & J. Piger (2003): “Is the Response of Output to Monetary Pol-
icy Asymmetric? Evidence from a Regime-Switching Coefficients Model.”
Working Paper 2001-022D, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
￿Lyziak, T., J. Przystupa, & E. Wróbel (2008): Monetary Policy Trans-
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Appendix A
LSTVAR Data and Estimation
Output
The CD enclosed to this thesis contains empirical data and Matlab codes, along
with the instructions for their use.
• Folder 1: Matlab codes + instructions
• Folder 2: Empirical data
Table A.1: Dataset
Variable Unit Source
GDP, s.a. EUR mil IMF IFS
industrial production, s.a. 2005=100 IMF IFS
consumer price index net 2005=100 IMF IFS
3 month money market rate p.a. IMF IFS
total credits CZK mil World Bank
PX index end of period Prague Stock Exchange
EUR/CZK nominal exchange rate monthly average Eurostat
Euro zone (EA-12) GDP, s.a. EUR mil. Eurostat
Euro zone (EA-12) HICP 2005=100 Eurostat
Euro zone (EA-12) money market rate EUR mil. Eurostat
A. LSTVAR Data and Estimation Output II
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Table A.2: Lag length selection criteria for final specification
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 1576.444 NA 2.18e-16 -19.03568 -18.92274 -18.98984
1 2376.056 1531.378 2.08e-20 -28.29158 -27.50098* -27.97065*
2 2426.278 92.53096* 1.75e-20* -28.46398* -26.99571 -27.86796
3 2452.884 47.08503 1.97e-20 -28.35011 -26.20419 -27.47901
4 2473.574 35.10934 2.40e-20 -28.16453 -25.34094 -27.01834
5 2504.183 49.71749 2.59e-20 -28.09919 -24.59795 -26.67792
6 2528.025 36.99094 3.06e-20 -27.95182 -23.77291 -26.25546
A. LSTVAR Data and Estimation Output III
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Table A.3: Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Test, p-values
Excluded Dependent variable (y)
(x) ip pr ir er cr
ei gdp 0.0000 0.3996 0.7053 0.1043 0.0226
ei pr 0.3328 0.0000 0.6311 0.3819 0.1676
ei ir 0.0969 0.5407 0.7578 0.5451 0.0465
ip 0.6435 0.0236 0.0416 0.6191
pr 0.4581 0.0078 0.1597 0.4951
ir 0.1263 0.5380 0.0124 0.0042
er 0.0588 0.1059 0.0017 0.1972
cr 0.1786 0.1618 0.0114 0.0089
H0: x does not Granger cause y; H1: x Granger causes y
A. LSTVAR Data and Estimation Output IV
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A. LSTVAR Data and Estimation Output VI
Figure A.5: Impulse responses from Linear VAR, model without foreign vari-














































5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60







5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60








5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60







5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Response of CR to IR
A. LSTVAR Data and Estimation Output VII
Figure A.6: Sensitivity analysis with GDP, high vs. low credit growth, 90%
confidence intervals
(a) GDP















































































Figure A.7: Sensitivity analysis with GDP, positive vs. negative shock, 90%
confidence intervals
(a) GDP

















































































A. LSTVAR Data and Estimation Output VIII
Figure A.8: Sensitivity analysis with the cycle length 60 months, high vs. low
credit growth, 90% confidence intervals
(a) Industrial production









































































Figure A.9: Sensitivity analysis with the cycle length 60 months, positive vs.
negative shock, 90% confidence intervals
(a) Industrial production




























































































real GDP national currency, 2000 prices IMF IFS
price index 2005=100 IMF IFS
3 month money market rate p.a. IMF IFS
private credit/GDP p.a. World Bank
bank credit/bank deposits p.a. World Bank
bank overhead costs/total assets p.a. World Bank
net interest margin p.a. World Bank



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B. PCHVAR Data and Estimation Output XII
Figure B.2: Impulse responses from PCHVAR conditioned on credit depen-












































Figure B.3: Impulse responses from PCHVAR conditioned on banking compe-












































B. PCHVAR Data and Estimation Output XIII




























































































B. PCHVAR Data and Estimation Output XIV
Figure B.6: Sensitivity analysis, impulse responses from PCHVAR conditioned












































Figure B.7: Sensitivity analysis, impulse responses from PCHVAR conditioned
on banking competition, credit dependence fixed at mean
(a) GDP
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